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INTRODUCTION
Po' niggers can't have no luck-
Nigger Jim, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn1
Some will find the N-word in my title jagged-edged and hurtful. Words can
wound: more than mere vehicles for the expression of ideas or the transfer of
information, words are deeds--acts with consequences-and the words "nigger"
and "nigga" are two of the most violent and blood-soaked verbal acts in the
English language. Nevertheless, used with the precision and reticence of a
surgeon's hands, these vicious epithets can also suture the places where blood
flows.
In that spirit, in profane language picked for its unparaphrasable power to
focus attention on the implications of moral condemnation for racial justice and
political solidarity, I use these jagged epithets here as part of a metaphoric
redescription, in racial terms, of the criminal law's ancient subjective culpability
or mens rea requirement. In this essay, in other words, a "nigga" is a metaphor for
black wickedness, black mens rea, which I will use to probe the intersection of
morality, race, and class in matters of blame and punishment and politics. An
example of a non-racialized metaphor for mens rea would be the common law's
"depraved heart" test of murderous mens rea in cases of unintentional homicide-
the jury is given the depraved heart metaphor and told to use it as the litmus test
. Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School. I
dedicate this Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law article to the Ohio State Law School students who
in the late 1960s helped my wrongfully convicted dad find the key to his own jailhouse door in the
hornbooks, casebooks, treatises and reporters that they provided. #PoeticJustice.
1 Mark Twain, Adventures ofHuckleberry Finn, in THE ART OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 149, 129
(Hamlin Hill & Walter Blair eds., 2d ed. 1969).
2 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 28-34 (1989) (identifying
metaphoric redescription as the source of revolutions in science, morality and law).
3 I start out using Nigga as a metaphor for mens rea in criminal matters and wind up using it
as a political performative aimed at unifying non-criminals and "niggas"; that is, it goes from being a
trope (for conceptual purposes) to a performative (for political purposes). As a political
performative, its irony becomes most evident.
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for serious subjective culpability.4 From the standpoint of this ancient heart
metaphor for moral blameworthiness, a "nigga" metaphorically is a depraved or
indifferent black heart; but on another level, my metaphorical redescription of
black subjective culpability and black mens rea in terms of "niggas" will be an
urgent political call to bond with and support black-hearted wrongdoers.
To that end, this essay proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I expounding on
the inadequacy of our current legal and moral vocabularies and my repurposing of
the words "nigger" and "nigga" to engage in an oppositional discourse I call
"nigga-talk." I use "nigga-talk" to help explain and problematize the need to
distinguish, even within the black community, law-abiding, respectable blacks
from so-called "niggas," or morally deficient and contemptible blacks. In short,
there exists a type of Black Criminal Litmus Test. Part II elaborates on this litmus
test by discussing what I coin "Good Negro Theory," the constellation of
assumptions, beliefs, and values that undergird the bad nigga-good negro
dichotomy and its contention that law-abiding blacks should distance themselves
from bad niggas. Part I also advances "Nigga Theory," an argument aimed at
eradicating the distinction between blacks and promoting solidarity between law-
abiders and law-breakers regardless of race. I return to this core aspect of Nigga
Theory in Part III, which discusses our retributive urge, causation, and our general
denial of accountability.
I. ON LANGUAGE, "NIGGAS," AND THE BLACK CRIMINAL LITMUS TEST
I first "dropped the N-bomb" at a Criminal Justice and Race Workshop for the
Association of American Law Schools [AALS] during the 1999 Annual Meeting in
New Orleans. In the company of sedate legal scholars, I performed an N-word-
laden gangsta rap song by Ice Cube titled The Nigga Ya Love to Hate, spitting lines
like "kicking shit called street knowledge-why more niggas in the pen than in
college? '5  I told my audience that the baffling silences our professional
vocabulary could not fill compelled me to use this profane alternative rather than
iterate the voice of speechlessness underneath the rigor, precision, and eloquence
of our scholarly marks and noises.
As criminal law professors, our primary professional vocabularies are those of
morality and law-the two language games prosecutors and defense lawyers must
master and deftly deploy-and thus I have thought a lot about the world of shared
meanings these vocabularies create and what limits they impose; what can be done
by one who speaks them and what cannot. As the son of a black prison inmate
4 See Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1946) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *199) ("At common law, the 'grand criterion' which 'distinguished
murder from other killing' was malice on the part of the killer and [for unintentional killings] this
malice was.. . 'the dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart.').
5 ICE CUBE, The Nigga Ya Love to Hate, on AMERIKKKA'S MOST WANTED (Universal Music
Group 1990).
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given 22 to 55 years for possession and sale of marijuana, and as a close friend of
many black inmates, I would characterize my relationship with the language of
blame and punishment inside and outside my law school classrooms over the past
twenty years as impossible, for I find the proud but calcified language of both the
legal academy and conventional morality--"choice," "free will," "personal
responsibility," "subjective culpability," "malice," "malignant heart," "moral
agency," and "mens rea"-not adequate to my needs and purposes, to my sense of
myself and my world, requiring me, as it plainly does, to view as wicked and
irresponsible my closest friends, family, and the up to 90% of young black men in
some inner city neighborhoods who will end up in jail, on probation, or on parole
at some point in their lives.6 For me, any language whose words and logic lock up
staggering numbers of truly disadvantaged black men on the ground of their own
moral deficiencies is a disabled and disabling device for grappling with meaning in
moral and criminal matters, one that ignores or discounts savage inequalities in
race and class and sweeps empirically demonstrable anti-black bias under the rug
of jury verdicts and "findings of fact" about guilt and innocence. Prevailing legal
and moral language organizes and claims a meaning for experience in a way that
blocks the access of "wicked" black wrongdoers to the empathy, sympathy, care
and concern of ordinary, law-abiding people; such language actively stalls
conscience in relation to such wrongdoers' suffering, masking the pity and waste
of mass incarceration and draconian punishment. Yet in my scholarly associations
and legal journals, I see an entrenched moral and legal vocabulary content to
admire its own paralysis, to accept with serenity its estrangement of
underprivileged and disadvantaged masses.
As James Boyd White points out, when words lose their meaning, a speaker
must make a new language, remake an old one, or radically repurpose old words to
serve new ends.7 In my N-word-laden 1999 AALS performance of Amerikkka's
Most Wanted, I radically reconstituted my cultural resources-my possibilities for
making and maintaining meaning-to make them adequate to my needs.
Specifically, I repurposed "nigger" and "nigga" as terms of art in an oppositional
discourse I shall call "nigga-talk." Nigga-talk uses this "troublesome",8 word-a
word Professor Randall Kennedy rightly calls the "nuclear bomb of racial epithets"
in his 2002 book Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word 9-in its
6 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 7 (9th ed. 2012) ("For an
inner-city black male, the lifetime risk of arrest and incarceration may approach 90 percent.") (citing
JEROME G. MILLER, NAT'L CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS & ALTERNATIVES, HOBBLING A
GENERATION: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF
AMERICA'S CITIES: BALTIMORE, MARYLAND (1992)).
7 See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 284 (1984).
8 See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME
WORD (2002).
9 Id. at 28.
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most condemnatory sense for conceptual purposes and in its most compassionate
sense for political purposes.
Conceptually, nigga-talk uses the "morally deficient black man" sense of
"nigga" to critique the categories, distinctions, and dichotomies of conventional
morality and the substantive criminal law.10 "Nigga" in this sense means precisely
what black comedian Chris Rock means in his famous laugh line, "I love black
people, but I hate niggas!", where lovable "black people" means "law-abiding,
respectable blacks" and "niggas" means morally deficient and contemptible black
criminals.1' As White points out, jokes, like all texts, are invitations to share the
speaker's response to the world which we accept through our laughter, 12 and
implicit in Rock's joke is a political invitation to distinguish between a law-
abiding and respectable "us" and a morally contemptible "them," an invitation to
niggerize--or niggarize-black wrongdoers, which black audiences in packed
auditoriums heartily accepted through peals of laughter and a chorus of "amens,"
"uh-huhs," and "preach!" Part moral mantra, part political slogan, part sneering
closing argument refrain, the phrase "I love black people but I hate niggas!" struck
a resonant chord with black audiences because many do view black wrongdoers as
morally condemnable "niggas."' 13 No utterances in the English language more
forcefully drive a political wedge between a worthy "us" and an unworthy "them"
than this vile epithet-none more bluntly express and inflame that widely shared
and deeply entrenched urge, to put it crudely, to retaliate and avenge, or, to dress it
up in loftier language, to "return suffering for moral evil voluntarily done' ' 14 or to
act on "the necessity of purging one's own country from depraved criminals" 5 or
to see blameworthy wrongdoers "'pa[y] one's debt' to society.,' 16  Legal
philosopher Meir Dan-Cohen aptly dubs this urge to blame and punish wicked
wrongdoers "the retributive urge."' 7 Because millions of Americans of all races
1o A "nigga" is a personification of moral blameworthiness in the same sense that the
"Reasonable Man" is a personification of moral innocence (i.e., reasonable mistakes and
shortcomings are exculpatory or mitigatory under many doctrines, including negligence, recklessness,
self-defense, provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, and duress). Both a "nigga" and a
Reasonable Man exemplify human characteristics, including human limitations and frailties-in the
case of"niggas," the deficiencies and limitations are generally viewed as not excusable; in the case of
the Reasonable Man, they (by definition) are excusable.
11 CHRIS ROCK: BRING THE PAIN (HBO television broadcast June 1, 1996).
12 See WHITE, supra note 7, at 14-20.
13 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 306 (1997) ("According to data collected
by a 1993 Gallup Poll, 82 percent of the blacks surveyed believed that the courts in their area do not
treat criminals harshly enough; ... 68 percent favored building more prisons so that longer sentences
could be given.").
14 H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIILITY 231 (1968).
15 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 228 (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, 1887).
16 HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 39 (1976).
17 Meir Dan-Cohen, Causation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 165-66 (Sanford
Kadish ed., 1983).
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share that laughing black audience's contempt for black wrongdoers, so-called
"niggas" inflame the retributive urge in millions of all races.
Rock's blunt moral distinction between respectable "black people" and
damnable "niggas" parallels the more genteel one asserted by Professor Randall
Kennedy between what he calls law-abiding "good Negroes" and criminal "bad
Negroes." Specifically, Kennedy exhorts good law-abiding blacks to "distinguish
sharply between 'good' and 'bad' Negroes" for the sake of safety and racial
respectability. 18  His litmus test for "bad Negroes" is identical to Rock's for
"niggas"-namely, criminal wrongdoing. In support of his distinguish-and-
distance-them-from-us approach, Professor Kennedy cites black civil rights icon
Thurgood Marshall. As Kennedy points out, Marshall, working on behalf of the
NAACP, initially allowed it to represent only good-"innocent"9 -- Negroes. For
example, Marshall refused to represent a sixteen year old black boy sentenced to
death for rape and attempted prison escape on grounds that "the youngster was 'not
the type of person to justify our intervention.' 20  Recast in Rock's street
vernacular, Thurgood Marshall sharply distinguished and distanced the interests of
"black people" from those of "niggas." According to Professor Kennedy, even
when Marshall later "loosened his policy" and represented some black defendants
he believed to be guilty, Marshall's worries about black people's respectability in
the eyes of whites kept Marshall from ever "tak[ing] the position that racism
excuses thuggery when perpetrated by blacks.",21  So the distinguished black
scholar, the venerable black Supreme Court Justice, and the iconic urban comedian
converge on the Black Criminal Litmus Test of condemnable blacks, differing only
in whether they call these morally odious creatures "niggas" or "bad Negroes" or
"thugs." Accordingly, I will use the terms "niggas," "niggers," and "bad Negroes"
interchangeably and in contradistinction to their loveable and respectable polar
opposites-"black people" and "good Negroes." In sum, at the conceptual level I
use these terms in their most morally judgmental and retributive-urge-inflaming
sense to first pinpoint, then discredit moral condemnations of black criminals. I
discredit them both on reliability grounds, given the pervasiveness of "unconscious
bias, ' 22 and on legitimacy grounds, given the simple reality of "moral luck.",
23
18 See KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 17.
"9 Id. at 20.
20 Id at20-21.
21 Id. at 21
22 Jody D. Armour, Nigga Theory: Luck, Law and Language in the Social Construction of
Niggas (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). This article is part of a larger book
project currently under review by a publisher. In chapters of my book not included in this article, I
extensively investigate the role of racially differential "attribution bias" and "empathy bias" in juror
assessments of a defendant's subjective culpability or mens rea. Id.
23 Id. In chapters of my book, currently under review by a publisher, I extensively investigate
the phenomenon of "moral luck" identified by moral philosophers Thomas Nagel and Bernard
Williams and apply it to questions of moral condemnation in the substantive criminal law. Id.
20141
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The reliance on mens rea in deciding criminal culpability has analogues here.
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and jurors routinely debate and weigh the
moral blameworthiness of wrongdoers because the substantive criminal law directs
them to under the ancient legal maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea-in
Blackstone's translation, "an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime
at all."24  Under this mens rea principle, it is unjust to punish someone who
commits an "unwarrantable act"--i.e. a wrongdoer25-unless he acted with a
"vicious" or wicked will. 26 As the Model Penal Code puts it, "[c]rime does and
should mean condemnation., 2 7  Thus, under the mens rea principle, if jurors
conclude that a wrongdoer 28 killed someone without the requisite subjective
wickedness or "vicious will," they must return a verdict of not guilty. So the
criminal law-through its mens rea requirement-routinely directs judges and
jurors to morally distinguish between wicked and innocent wrongdoers and to
differentiate degrees of wicked criminality for purposes of punishment.29 Under
the law of homicide, for instance, a wrongdoer can suffer different punishments
depending on whether he is found wicked in the 1St or 2 nd Degree; voluntarily or
involuntarily wicked; purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently wicked; or
wickedly depraved and indifferent. Correspondingly, under the Black Criminal
Litmus Test championed by proponents of a politics of respectability in criminal
24 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 213 (8th ed. 2007). Under
our substantive criminal law, an alleged harm-doer can be "innocent" in one of two ways: innocent of
causing the harm or (assuming causation) morally innocent, that is, he caused the harm but did so
without subjective culpability. See Id.
25 1 will use the term wrongdoer to refer to someone who commits a prohibited and hence
wrongful act (i.e. commits the actus reus). One can commit a wrongful act, in this sense be guilty of
wrongdoing, without subjective culpability or mens rea. Wrongdoing plus mens rea are the main
ingredients of criminal guilt under this usage.
26 Thus, a driver can hit and kill a pedestrian (thus qualifying as a "wrongdoer" by
committing the prohibited act of causing a death) without moral blameworthiness or mens rea if, say,
he was overwhelmed by a sudden emergency.
27 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.05 cmt. I at 283 (1985) ("[T]hat the
defendant's act was culpable."). Not everyone who commits a prohibited or criminal act is culpable.
For instance, a driver can kill a pedestrian-a prohibited act-without subjective culpability if the
victim darted from between parked cars and the driver's reactions, even if not perfect, were those of
an ordinary man or woman.
28 Wrongdoing here means commission of the actus reus or prohibited act. Not all
wrongdoers, however, act with subjective culpability. Under this usage, only wrongdoing
accompanied by subjective culpability or mens rea makes an actor criminally liable under standard
analysis.
29 Criminal conviction stigmatizes because it is meant to. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, criminal "felony" is "as bad a word as you can give to man or thing." Morissette v.
United States 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (citation omitted). Thus the moral credibility of the criminal
law and its processes depends entirely on whether, first, it criminalizes only acts that deserve moral
condemnation and, second, it only blames and punishes actors who deserve moral condemnation and
even then it only blames and punishes them the amount they deserve.
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matters like Kennedy and Rock, 30 a jury could find a morally blameworthy black
wrongdoer to be a "nigga" in the First or Second Degree, a Voluntary or
Involuntary "nigga," a purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent "nigga," or a
"nigga" with a depraved and malignant heart. In fact, most "official niggas" (i.e.,
blacks formally convicted of a crime) have been found subjectively wicked in one
of these ways beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or other fact finder, so criminal
conviction provides assurance-backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S.
criminal justice system--that only black wrongdoers who deserve our most
corrosive contempt achieve the status of felonious "official niggas."
Politically, a key insight of the law and literature movement is that the true
center of value of a word, text, or performance of language, its most important
meaning, is to be found not in any factual information that it conveys-not in what
is says-but in what it does, specifically, in the community that it establishes with
its audience. "It is here," says James Boyd White, "that the author offers his reader
a place to stand, a place from which he can observe and judge the characters and
events of the world ... ,31 The place I offer my reader to stand through the many
repetitions and juxtapositions and performances of the "N-word"-a place made
solid by my substantive, conceptual uses of the term to pinpoint unwarranted moral
condemnation 32-is one beyond such condemnation, one from which it can be
seen that a person's self is a tissue of contingencies whose moral record is
determined by the union of fortuity and human frailty rather than mere "free will."
It is a place that prioritizes compassion, concern, and mercy over retribution,
retaliation, and revenge. Hence, it is a place from which disproportionately poor
black criminals can be understood as tragic social facts for which we as a class and
race-driven nation are accountable, rather than as wicked wrongdoers mired in
self-destruction for which they alone are to blame. Accordingly, I use the N-word
in this essay as a brush stroke in a new political landscape, one in which the very
meaning of the word-its substantive content and range of application-is part of a
fierce contest over the "us" and "them" of politics, over the formation and
transformation of individual and collective black identities.
Allow me to go a step further. Politically conscious black urban poets and N-
word virtuosos-The Last Poets, Tupac Shakur, dead prez, Nas, NWA, Ice Cube,
30 And assuming the moral universe of proponents of the Black Criminal Litmus Test is not
Manichean, binary, all or none. See supra p. 13.
31 WHITE, supra note 7, at 17.
32 See Armour, supra note 22. 1 fully develop my substantive or conceptual arguments
against the reliability and legitimacy of moral condemnations of black wrongdoers in companion
pieces to this general outline that make up the book I have written that is currently under review by a
publisher. The first applies the phenomenon of "moral luck" to the entire body of the substantive
criminal law. The second radically overhauls the prevailing model of mens rea to expose the places
where bias lives in the substantive criminal law and adjudication ofjust deserts. The third applies the
work of Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, Donald Davidson, and George Lakoff to the question whether the
N-word can transcend its racist roots and play a leading role in changing how we think about
criminals and in helping us stand in solidarity with them.
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Jay Z-vividly illustrate how people use words, sometimes the very same word, to
embrace or push away, recognize or deny, others. In the hands of these poets
gangsta rap is N-word laden oppositional political discourse; for them "nigga talk"
is language smitheryed 33 to challenge conventional characterizations of black
criminals with ironies, inversions, and invitations to bond with them. These
oppositional black poets provide the inspiration for my metaphoric redescription of
mens rea and moral blame in terms of the N-word. After all, as Richard Rorty
observes in his philosophical essays on language through the lenses of
Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Nietzsche, viewing human history as the history of
successive metaphors lets us "see the poet, in the generic sense of the maker of
new words, the shaper of new languages, as the vanguard of the species" and of
revolutionary science, morality, and legal theory.34 The common insight animating
the word work of these philosophers and "gangsta" poets-Nas and Nietzsche,
Davidson and dead prez, Wittgenstein and Ice Cube, Lakoff and The Last Poets-
is that "truth" in matters of morality and justice is "a mobile army of metaphors," a
ceaseless struggle over metaphorical re-description, a pitched political battle over
the range of application of words and symbols.
II. ON "GOOD NEGRO THEORY" AND "NIGGA THEORY"
Drawing on the N-word's conceptual and political utility, this Part constructs
a model, which I will call "Good Negro Theory," of the values, beliefs, and
assumptions that underlie efforts to morally and politically distinguish between
law-abiding "good Negroes" and law-breaking "Niggas." But first, to fiercely
contest Good Negro Theory, I will expound "Nigga Theory."
A. On "Nigga Theory" and the Centrality of Class
I use the term "Nigga Theory" to refer to a group of interlocking proofs and
performances aimed at destroying the distinction between disproportionately
privileged law-abiding blacks and disproportionately poor black criminals and
promoting solidarity between them. To be sure, many of the proofs and
performances underling Nigga Theory have the potential to also promote solidarity
between all law-abiders and all criminals regardless of race or class. However,
because black males bear the brunt of our current blame and punishment practices,
because stereotypes and prejudice make black criminals especially likely to stoke
the retributive urge in ordinary Americans, and because many misguided black
leaders, lawmakers, scholars, and prosecutors have supported and still support the
mass incarceration of young black males at the core of the crack plague and its
33 Toni Morrison, Lecture Upon the Award of the Nobel Prize for Literature (Dec. 7, 1993), available
at http'/www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1993/morrison-lecture.html.
34 RORTY, supra note 2, at 20, 37.
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aftermath, it is apposite to term this group of proofs and performances Nigga
Theory.
Now, a model. Nigga Theory:
1) Focuses on the moral and criminal condemnation of largely poor
black males whose criminal status makes them "niggas" or "bad
Negroes" according to critics;
and
2) Addresses itself especially-though certainly not exclusively-to
black leaders, lawyers, jurors, voters and ordinary folk.
Critical to an understanding of Nigga Theory is an understanding of the role
class has played and continues to play in the social construction of "niggas." As
the careful studies of Ruth Peterson and Lauren Krivo on the links between race,
place, class and crime in the urban black community demonstrate, the vast majority
of "violent crimes" Americans worry most about-murder, manslaughter, robbery,
aggravated assault-are committed by "extremely" disadvantaged blacks, not the
black bourgeoisie, whose crime rates are much closer to those of their white
middle and upper-middle-class counterparts.35 In terms of violent crime, bad
Negroes are disproportionately truly disadvantaged blacks living in extremely
disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Good Negroes, by contrast, disproportionately come from the ranks of middle
and upper-middle class blacks living in much better neighborhoods. As one of
both the wealthiest and wealthiest majority black areas in the United States, and as
part of the single largest geographically contiguous middle and upper-middle class
black area in the United States, the hills of View Park that I call home might be the
Good Negro capitol of America-it is brimming with well-to-do and hence
relatively law-abiding Negroes.
For going on two generations now, the working class and poor black
neighborhoods that surround my own predominantly black and prosperous
"Golden Ghetto"36-including South Central, The Jungle, Inglewood, Watts, and
Compton-have hemorrhaged staggering numbers of young black men into prison
35 See generally Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged
Neighborhoods and Urban Crime, 75 Soc. FORCES 619 (1996); Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson,
The Structural Context of Homicide: Accounting for Racial Differences in Process, 65 AM. SoOL.
REv. 547 (2000) [hereinafter The Structural Context of Homicide]; Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J.
Krivo, Macrostructural Analyses of Race, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime: Recent Lessons and New
Directions for Research, 31 ANNU. REv. SOCIOL. 331 (2005) [hereinafter Macrostructural Analyses
of Race, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime]; Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Race, Residence, and
Violent Crime: A Structure of Inequality, 57 KAN. L. REv. 903 (2009).
36 As one of the wealthiest predominately black areas in the country, View Park has been
called the Black Beverly Hills as well as Golden Ghetto.
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yards and juvenile detention centers. The flow of poor blacks from bleak streets to
cell blocks turned torrential in the mid-1980s with the onset of the crack plague
and enactment of laws like the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which ushered in a
new era of mandatory minimum sentences for possession of specified amounts of
cocaine and a 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between distribution of powder and
crack cocaine. Ironically or fittingly, depending on the interpretation of the
observer, these laws were co-sponsored by Mickey Leland, chair of the
Congressional Black Caucus, and Harlem congressman Charles Rangel and
supported by most members of the Congressional Black Caucus. 3 7  Truly
disadvantaged black males took the brunt of these severe new sanctions. Thanks in
part to the actions and attitudes of these and other largely middle-class black
leaders toward largely poor black male wrongdoers, nearly two generations of poor
black males have been hobbled if not lost. That so many black leaders and
lawmakers, i.e., good negroes, played a leading role in the mass incarceration of
black wrongdoers--especially young black males-should come as no surprise in
view of the aforementioned "niggerization" of black criminals in both popular
culture and legal discourse during the crack plague and in its festering aftermath.
Class plays a central role in the social construction of "niggas"-in whether
we explain their wrongdoing in terms of their own internal moral deficiencies or
instead in terms of external social factors and structural determinants-because
being broke, like being a criminal, means being viewed as morally deficient by
millions of Americans. Put differently, millions blame poverty solely on
blameworthy poor people just as they blame wrongdoing solely on blameworthy
criminals.38
Fifty years ago Michael Harrington's extraordinarily influential book, The
Other America, debunked the then-popular belief that America was a classless
society by shining a light on the "invisible" poor, especially inner-city blacks,
Appalachian whites, farm workers, and the elderly.39 But his explanation of
poverty absolved middle-class America of accountability for the plight of the poor
by attributing poverty not to macro-level social factors like social inequality or the
simple absence of jobs but instead to the absence of proper values and dispositions
in poor people themselves, that is, to their twisted proclivities and "culture of
37 Brian Mann, Timeline: Black America's Surprising 40-Year Support for the Drug War,
PRISONTIME (Aug. 12 2013), http://prisontime.org/2013/08/12/timeline-black-support-for-the-war-
on-drugs/; NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: How LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 124
(2014) ("13 of 20 voting members of the CBC had voted for the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.").
38 Put differently, millions of Americans reject macro-level social explanations of the poor
just as they reject social explanations of black criminals. So the urge to blame criminals and the urge
to blame the poor are very close cousins. Viewing the poor in light of the retributive urge may
explain why we may deny causal responsibility for their plight and why we may feel a diminished
sense of urgency or obligation to rescue. Both poor people and criminals inflame the urge to blame
them for their respective conditions and hence help us deny collective accountability for their plight.
39 See generally MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1964).
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poverty., 40  In Harrington's words, "[t]here is . . . a language of the poor, a
psychology of the poor, a worldview of the poor. To be impoverished is to be an
internal alien, to grow up in a culture that is radically different from the one that
dominates the society.",
4 1
The celebrated Moynihan advanced a similar view, attributing inner-city
poverty to deficiencies in the structure of the "Negro family. ' 42  Harvard urban
government professor Edward C. Banfield-head of the Presidential Task Force on
Model Cities under Nixon and advisor to Presidents Ford and Reagan-put it this
way, "the lower-class individual lives from moment to moment. . . . Impulse
governs his behavior . . . . He is therefore radically improvident: whatever he
cannot consume immediately he considers valueless. . . . [He] has a feeble,
attenuated sense of self ....
In the Reagan years, the "culture of poverty" hypothesis ripened into plump
orthodoxy; it became received wisdom that the cause of poverty was not macro-
level social factors like meager wages, galloping unemployment, and economic
inequality, but rather the internal deficiencies of the poor, who, as Barbara
Ehrenreich points out, were viewed as "dissolute, promiscuous, prone to addiction
and crime, unable to 'defer gratification,' or possibly even set an alarm clock." 44
Even Bill Clinton formulated and implemented policies guided by "culture of
poverty" thinking.45 Indeed, much legislation enacted by both Democratic and
Republican lawmakers today remains imbued with this perspective.46
So from the standpoint of Nigga Theory, those who deny our collective
accountability for the plight of both criminals and the poor--call them Deniers-
40 Id. at 15.
41 Id. at 17.
42 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965)
available at http://web.stanford.edu/-mrosenfe/Moynihan's%20The%2ONegro%2OFamily.pdf.
43 EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENELY CITY REVISITED 61-62 (1974).
44 Barbara Ehrenreich, Rediscovering Poverty: How We Cured "The Culture of Poverty, " Not
Poverty Itself TOMDISPATCH (Mar. 15, 2012), http://tomdispatch.com/blog/175516/. As Barbara
Ehrenreich points out, Charles Murray argued in his popular 1984 book Losing Ground that "any
attempt to help the poor with their material circumstances would only have the unexpected
consequence of deepening their depravity." Id.
41 In 1992 Bill Clinton famously campaigned on the promise to "end welfare as we know it."
Douglas Besharov, End Welfare Lite as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2006),
http://nytimes.com/2006/08/15/opinion/15besharov.html. On August 22, 1996, Clinton signed into
law the historic welfare legislation the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305)
[hereinafter "PROWORA]. The PROWORA rewrote six decades of social policy, ending the federal
guarantee of cash assistance to the poor and turning welfare programs over to the states. Clinton and Joe Biden
also spearheaded the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). See,
e.g., Carrie Johnson, 20 Years Later, Parts of Major Crime Bill Viewed As Terrible Mistake, NPR (Sept 12,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/12/34773699920-years-later-major-crime-bill-viewed-as-terfible-nistake.
46 Ehrenreich, supra note 44.
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are bi-partisan and committed to the same logic of denial. A logic that discounts
macro-level social explanations of crime and poverty, and instead adopts (or gives
undue weight to) individual-level explanations centered on the "moral poverty" of
the poor, the "moral poverty" of criminals, and hence the hyperconcentrated
"moral depravity" of poor black criminals, who get whipsawed by both class and
race stereotypes 47 and thus are especially likely to stoke the retributive urge. From
the perspective of Nigga Theory, poor black criminals belong to a special category
of hyperconcentrated otherness that makes them easy to hate-a profound
otherness that the words "nigger" and "nigga" capture with fierce felicity.
The retributive urge, even in the black community, to blame and punish
"niggas," fueled by ingrained stereotypes of black wrongdoers as morally deficient
and depraved, 48 and further stoked by their niggerization in popular stage acts,
books, and op-eds by black entertainers, scholars, and commentators, makes the
claims of Deniers more persuasive to many ordinary law-abiding Americans. This
urge makes it harder for them to recognize the structural determinants of-and
hence our collective accountability for-what I will call "the cataclysmic crack
plague and its festering aftermath," a monumental and roughly 30-year-long crime
and incarceration disaster that first struck black America in the mid 1980s, and
which has inflicted as much misery on the black community as a thousand
Hurricane Katrinas slamming a thousand Ninth Wards. To be more concise, our
urge to blame and punish black wrongdoers helps ordinary Americans deny our
collective accountability for the foreseeable criminal acts of poor blacks stranded
in forsaken neighborhoods brimming with guns and drugs. I will show, in other
words, how an inflamed retributive urge toward so-called niggas causes voters,
jurors, judges, lawmakers, and others to ignore, deny, or downplay the role of
macro-level social factors (for which we are collectively accountable) in both the
production and construction 49 of black criminals. I will trace the following links
between the process of niggerization, the retributive urge, and America's collective
denial of accountability:
47 Just as with criminal "others," the plight of poor "others" can be explained either from an
internal, micro-level perspective that reinforces their deficient "otherness," or from an external,
macro-level perspective that disputes their alien otherness by looking at the poor as just ordinary
people who lack jobs with living wages, resources, and prospects.
48 Recall the Willie Horton ad featured in the 1988 Bush-Dukakis presidential race that unapologetically
played on the "wicked and depraved black recidivist' stereotype. See Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad, YouTuBE
(Nov. 3,2008), https'/www.youwbe.com/watch .?N--o9KMSSEZOY.
49 It may be useful to distinguish between criminal construction and production as follows:
Social factors and other factors beyond the control of the wrongdoers may produce criminals in the
sense of provoking or tempting or pressuring them to voluntarily do wrong. In contrast, those who
must judge the subjective culpability or mens rea of these voluntary wrongdoers-jurors, judges,
lawmakers and laymen alike-may construct criminals in the sense of making biased normative
judgments about their subjective culpability and just deserts. Production focuses on the impact of
social forces on the behavior of wrongdoers, on increasing their number. Construction focuses on the
impact of stereotypes and prejudice on decision makers who must assess a wrongdoer's moral guilt or
innocence and the grade or degree of his crime.
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e The better wrongdoers fit the "depraved nigga" stereotype, the more
they stir the retributive urge for blame and punishment;
e The more wrongdoers stir the retributive urge, the easier it is for
Americans to deny a causal connection between the specific criminal acts
of poor black wrongdoers and general social facts like racism and
joblessness;
* Finally, the easier it is to deny that social forces cause criminal
wrongdoing, the easier it is to deny our collective accountability for the
crack plague and its legacy. 50
In short, I will show how the powerful urge to damn and condemn "niggas"
induces us to deny our collective accountability for the criminal consequences of
being broke, black and hopeless in post-civil rights America.
However, Nigga Theory is not just descriptive. Nigga Theory is also
prescriptive, and rests on the hopeful and optimistic premise that once the moral
basis for the retributive urge toward black criminals is shown to be illegitimate,
irrational and unreliable, it may become easier for fair-minded Americans to curb
the urge to condemn such wrongdoers and recognize our collective accountability
for their plight and the causal links leading to their plight. For example, consider
the last 30 years of crime and incarceration that constitute the crack epidemic and
its legacy. There are causal links between those 30 years of crime and the
following five macro-level social facts:
* Extreme social and economic inequality in the setting of a cultural
belief system sociologists call the American Dream5"
* The massive flow of jobs from dying rustbelt cities and the stampede of
the black bourgeoisie from economically integrated black neighborhoods
50 To be more concise, I will show how niggerizing black criminals inflames the retributive
urge and thus keeps us as a nation from recognizing our collective accountability for their
wrongdoing. According to Deniers, because the intervening and morally deficient choices of
criminals and poor people break the causal link between social forces on the one hand and poverty or
crime on the other, we as a nation are absolved of accountability for the crime and poverty
foreseeably resulting from criminogenic social forces. See infra Part III.
51 "It is when a system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain common
success goalsfor the population at large, while the social structure rigorously restricts or completely
closes access to approved modes of reaching these goals for a considerable part of the same
population, that deviant behavior ensues on a large scale." ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 200 (1968); see also Robert Merton, Social Structure andAnomie, 3 AM. SOCIOL.
REV. 672 (1938); STEVEN MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 9-10
(5th ed. 2013).
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to economically segregated formerly white ones like my own in View
Park5
2
e Well-documented decisions by high ranking U.S. officials during the
Reagan and George H. Bush administrations to fight communism by
prioritizing foreign policy over drug enforcement and thus knowingly-
though not conspiratorially-helping flood poor black neighborhoods
with crack in the name of national security,
53
* Political posturing and opportunism by lawmakers from the Democratic
Party, Congressional Black Caucus, and Republican Party on the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 in response to the cocaine-induced death of
Boston-bound basketball star Len Bias, resulting in "the criminalization
52 [T]he growing problem ofjoblessness in the inner city... [is] partly created by the
changing social composition of inner-city neighborhoods. . . . In the 1940s, 1950s, and
even the 1960s, lower-class, working-class, and middle-class black urban families all
resided more or less in the same ghetto areas, albeit on different streets .... The exodus
of black middle-class professionals from the inner city has been increasingly
accompanied by a movement of stable working-class blacks to higher-income
neighborhoods in other parts of the city and to the suburbs. Confined by restrictive
covenants to communities also inhabited by the urban black lower classes, the black
working and middle classes in earlier years provided stability to inner-city neighborhoods
and perpetuated and reinforced societal norms and values. In short, their very presence
enhanced the social organization of ghetto communities.
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 143 (1987).
Yana Kucheva and Richard Sander reach conclusions consistent with this view in their analysis
of the relationship between Shelley and the hyper-concentration of criminogenic disadvantage in poor
black neighborhoods:
We find strong and fairly consistent support for the "Shelley" hypotheses, while the
"white abandonment" hypotheses are generally unsupported or weakly supported. Our
data suggests that almost immediately after Shelley in 1948, blacks began to enter
middle-class covenanted neighborhoods that were adjacent to existing black enclaves.
The "blockbusting" phenomenon, we suspect, quickly became the institutional midwife
for much of the white-to-black transition. Over the next twenty years, black districts
dramatically increased in size, substantial portions of the black middle-class became
homeowners, and the old ghettos became poorer and more economically isolated from
affluent blacks.
Yana Kucheva & Richard Sander, The Misunderstood Consequences of Shelley v. Kraemer, 48 Soc.
ScI. RES. 212, 227 (2014).
" See S. REP. No. 100-165, at 1-14 (1988) [hereinafter Kerry Committee Report]. In addition
to the Kerry Committee Report's documentation of links between government agencies like the CIA
and groups involved in cocaine distribution, a useful discussion can be found in what historian Arthur
Schmidt calls a limited but "important starting point" for understanding links between U.S. policies
and cocaine trafficking in the 1980s. See Arthur Schmidt, An Unhealthy Prescription, H-NET
REVIEWS (April 1999), http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=3016 (reviewing JONATHON
MARSHALL & PETER DALE SCOTT, COCAINE POLITICS: DRUGS, ARMIES, AND THE CIA IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (1991)); see also Peter Kombluh, Crack, the Contras, and the CIA: The Storm over "Dark
Alliance", COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. (January/February 1997), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/storm.htm.
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of U.S. foreign policy" through mandatory minimums and gross
sentencing disparities for crack-related crimes, 14
54 Len Bias was a University of Maryland student and star basketball player who died from a
powder cocaine overdose less than 48 hours after he was drafted in the first round by the Boston
Celtics as heir apparent to Larry Bird as the face of the franchise. As Dan Baum observes in his
book:
Immediately upon returning from the July 4 recess, Tip O'Neill called an
emergency meeting of the crime-related committee chairmen. Write me some goddamn
legislation, he thundered. All anybody up in Boston is talking about is Len Bias. The
papers are screaming for blood. We need to get out front on this now. This week.
Today. The Republicans beat us to it in 1984 and I don't want that to happen again. I
want dramatic new initiatives for dealing with crack and other drugs. If we can do this
fast enough, he said to the Democratic leadership arrayed around him, we can take the
issue away from the White House.
In life, Len Bias was a terrific basketball player. In death, he became the Archduke
Ferdinand of the Total War on Drugs. What came before had been only skirmishing; the
real Drug War had yet to begin. Within weeks, the country would be marching, bayonets
fixed.
DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF FAILURE 225 (1996).
The result was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, complete with mandatory minimums and
sentencing disparities. Eric E. Sterling, who was counsel to the U.S. House Committee on the
Judiciary and was involved in the passage of mandatory minimum sentencing laws, is now President
of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation. Eric E. Sterling, Drug Laws And Snitching: A Primer,
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/primer/.
His first-hand account of what happened, told to PBS's Frontline, confirms Baum's description
in Smoke and Mirrors:
In 1986, the Democrats in Congress saw a political opportunity to outflank
Republicans by "getting tough on drugs" after basketball star Len Bias died of a cocaine
overdose. In the 1984 election the Republicans had successfully accused Democrats of
being soft on crime. The most important Democratic political leader, House Speaker
"Tip" O'Neill, was from Boston, MA. The Boston Celtics had signed Bias. During the
July 4 congressional recess, O'Neill's constituents were so consumed with anger and
dismay about Bias' death, O'Neill realized how powerful an anti-drug campaign would
be.
O'Neill knew that for Democrats to take credit for an anti-drug program in
November elections, the bill had to get out of both Houses of Congress by early October.
That required action on the House floor by early September, which meant that
committees had to finish their work before the August recess. Since the idea was born in
early July, the law-writing committees had less than a month to develop the ideas, to
write the bills to carry out those ideas, and to get comments from the relevant government
agencies and the public at large.
One idea was considered for the first time by the House Judiciary Committee four
days before the recess began. It had tremendous political appeal as "tough on drugs."
This was the creation of mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases. It was a type of
penalty that had been removed from federal law in 1970 after extensive and careful
consideration. But in 1986, no hearings were held on this idea. No experts on the
relevant issues, no judges, no one from the Bureau of Prisons, or from any other office in
the government, provided advice on the idea before it was rushed through the committee
and into law. Only a few comments were received on an informal basis. After bouncing
back and forth between the Democratic controlled House and the Republican controlled
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And finally
* Empirically demonstrable unconscious bias in direct moral judgments
of black wrongdoers by judges, jurors, lawmakers, police officers,
prosecutors, voters and other powerful social decision makers.55
These five factors explain both the dramatically disproportionate rates of
criminal wrongdoing among poor black males and the lack of empathy for them in
jury boxes, legislative chambers, and voting booths.
To help us curb the urge to condemn blameworthy blacks long enough to
recognize these five macro-level social factors as the causes of the crack plague
and its consequences, I will discredit the twin convictions that undergird the
retributive urge toward so-called niggas, namely:
A) our self-congratulatory substantive conviction that persons deserve
credit and blame for what they do irrespective of contingency
and
B) our naive epistemological conviction that judges, jurors, and others
called upon to make moral judgments of black wrongdoers can do so
without conscious or unconscious racial bias.56
These twin convictions sanctify57 the retributive urge by reassuring us that
any "niggas" blamed and punished to satisfy it deserve their state-inflicted pain
and suffering and solitary confinement and sometimes death. Under Nigga
Theory, however, the twin phenomena of moral luck and ubiquitous unconscious
bias subvert the support for these convictions both in theory and in practice. My
hope is that once the absence of any rational or reliable moral ground for
distinguishing wicked from worthy blacks has been exposed, once the urge to
Senate as each party jockeyed for political advantage, The Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986
finally passed both houses a few weeks before the November elections. Id.
The astounding spike in black arrests and convictions after passage of this act, especially
between 1986 and 1999, is well-documented and mind-boggling. See e.g., Alyssa L. Beaver, Note,
Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. (2010).
55 This includes empirically demonstrable unconscious empathy-bias and racially differential
attribution bias.
56 The first conviction goes to the substantive question of whether there is a legitimate and
rational difference between praise and blame. The second goes to the "epistemic" one of (assuming
for the sake -f argument that there is a substantive difference between them), whether we can
accurately come to know which category any particular case should fall into.
57 See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 81-82
(1883).
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blame and punish "niggas" loses its footing in logic and fairness, 58 readers can
more clearly see black wrongdoers not as radically "other" moral monsters to be
damned, but rather as "social facts" 59 to be deplored and, if necessary,
incapacitated and, if possible, rehabilitated, but never, as now, harshly punished in
the name of revenge, retaliation, or retribution. 
60
Having described Nigga Theory, I now turn to Good Negro Theory.
B. On "Good Negro Theory" and the "Ostracizer"
For greater precision and clarity, I have coined the term "Good Negro
Theory" to refer to the constellation of assumptions, beliefs, and values that
undergird the bad Negro-good Negro dichotomy and its corollary contention that
law-abiding blacks should socially and politically ostracize black criminals. This
interconnected assortment of values, beliefs, and assumptions can be viewed as
interlocking tools in an apparatus-call it an "Ostracizer"--designed to advance
the social interests of disproportionately privileged law-abiding blacks. The
Ostracizer includes:
1. Calibrated Nigga Detector, outfitted with
A) Warning System
and
B) Blaming System,
2. Built-in Excuse Deflector,
3. Double Barreled Distinguish and Distance Device,
4. Good Negro Code of Ethics, and
5. Cost-Benefit, Wealth-Maximizing Moral Compass.
In addition to promoting the social interests of law-abiding blacks, the
Ostracizer also helps America, as a collective social actor, deny accountability for
the foreseeable consequences of its criminogenic social conditions and state
actions. It does this by reducing crime to the bad choices of morally deficient
58 It is patently unjust to blame and punish people whose blameworthiness we cannot fairly or
justly determine. This is precisely the point of the venerable "presumption of innocence" and ancient
"mens rea" or subjective culpability requirement in criminal cases-both rest on the premise that
only blameworthy wrongdoers are proper objects of our desire for vengeance or retribution.
59 As "human-all-too-human" social facts in the sense of being the result of human frailty
subjected to certain social forces and other factors beyond their control.
60 In viewing criminal matters through macro-level social lenses, this article adopts an
unapologetically determinist perspective in that it views criminal wrongdoing as ultimately
determined by social forces (for which America, as a collective social actor, is accountable) and other
factors beyond the control of wrongdoers. As moral philosophers Thomas Nagel and Bernhard
Williams show, morally we are at the mercy of luck. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, in ETHICS:
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 446 (Gordon Marino ed., Modem Library 2010); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 20 (1981).
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individuals at whom the retributive urge should be aimed and on whom it should
be satisfied.
Below, I describe in more detail each of the Ostracizer's devices.
1. Nigga Detector
The most important device in the Ostracizer is the calibrated Nigga Detector,
for bad Negroes must be positively identified before being distinguished,
distanced, and disgraced. The calibrated Nigga Detector consists of two separate
systems for assessing blacks in criminal matters-a warning system for
"suspicious blacks" whom ordinary people would view as posing a heightened risk
of wrongdoing, and a blaming system for blacks who actually have done wrong.
As part of its warning system, the Detector identifies "patently good" and
"suspicious" Negroes. As part of its blaming system, the Nigga Detector identifies
"real" Niggas. In keeping with this distinction between warnings and
condemnations, the two sources of error that can undermine the Detector's results
are: 1) inaccurate predictions about whether a given black person is committing or
about to commit a crime and 2) unreliable inferences about the wickedness or
mens rea of a black person who has clearly committed a past wrongful act.
i. The Warning System: Assessing Riskiness
First, consider the Detector's warning system, whose sole function is to assess
an ambiguous black person's riskiness, specifically the risk that he is
committing-or is about to commit-a wrongful act.61  In this respect the
Detector's operation raises issues commonly couched in terms of "racial
profiling," "reasonable suspicion," "probable cause," "the Fourth Amendment,"
and "criminal procedure." What is more, the Detector's race-sensitive predictions
and warnings reflect ordinary people's risk assessments of ambiguous blacks. In
Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism, I dubbed the social price blacks must pay as
targets of racial profiling, rooted in racial stereotypes and statistical
generalizations, the "Black Tax.",
62
The Detector's warning system operationalizes the Black Tax by using
different sounds, lights, and scrolling electronic ticker tape displays to differentiate
blacks according to the kind and degree of criminal risk they appear to pose to
ordinary people. Thus, when pointed at "patently Good Negroes" (that is, blacks
who ordinary people would view as posing no meaningful risk of wrongdoing, say,
61 Risks of criminality can figure in predictions of fliture criminal acts (e.g. in self-defense
cases) and ex post facto determinations of the likelihood that a particular defendant committed the
prohibited act of which he is accused. This analysis applies mostly to predictions of imminent
wrongdoing or inferences of current, ongoing wrongdoing.
62 JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13-15 (1997).
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nattily clad black Brahmins at a Jack and Jill cotillion in the "Black Beverly
Hills" 63), the Detector's warning system warbles melodiously, glows good-Negro
green, and scrolls "Safe Negro" across its electronic ticker tape display.
When aimed at blacks who ordinary people would view as dangerous (say, a
"big, black man" under ambiguous circumstances), it activates flashing yellow
caution lights and differentiates three different kinds of "suspicious Negroes":
1. Somewhat suspicious Negroes, who elicit a scrolling nigga advisory
and a deep monotonous drone like a bee on the wing or humming
refrigerator;
2. Very suspicious Negroes, who trigger a scrolling nigga alert and a
stream of midrange horn honks; and
3. Imminently dangerous Negroes, who activate a scrolling nigga alarm
and high-pitched emergency sirens.
Bear in mind that nigga alarms, alerts, and advisories are predictions and risk
assessments rooted in the beliefs, assumptions and perceptions of ordinary men
and women. Because the law defines the perceptions and responses of ordinary
people as "reasonable," 64 the Detector's warnings reflect "reasonable" risk
assessments of the dangerousness of ambiguous blacks. Of course, appearances
can be deceiving, so law-abiding Negroes can trigger false alarms, alerts, and
advisories in ordinary people. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the law such false
warnings are "reasonable mistakes" as long as they are the kind that ordinary
people would make under similar circumstances.65
63 Another nickname that, in addition to the "Golden Ghetto," View Park goes by.
64 See ARMOUR, supra note 62, at 22-27; Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781,
782-83 (1994) [hereinafter Race Ipsa Loquitur].
65 Case in Point and Cautionary Tale:
Call it arresting irony or just improbable farce, but midday Black Friday of 2011, while laying
out these lucubrations on "suspicious Negroes" on my laptop, I had an eerie nigga-alarm-laden
visitation, complete with a portable steel cage and cocked assault weapons. I was ruminating in the
rumpus room of our upper-middle class Hillside home in our economically gated all-black
neighborhood when my dogs started barking, which at midday means The Mailman Cometh. Our
dogs hate to hear the postman clang the door on our mailbox shut after stuffing it mostly with junk
mail and come-on schemes-M E G A B U C K S You Could Be Our Next Millionaire!-that pander
to the poverty all about this privileged enclave. (Buried in the small print are the impossibly long
odds against winning: 505,000,000 to one). To spare the dogs that acoustic insult, as usual I walked
over to the foyer, swung open the front door, and stepped outside to intercept the mail. But, by
striding across our doorsill into a cloudless Southland afternoon, everything thrown into brilliant
visibility by the impassive slant of our southwestern sun, I set off wailing sirens and scrolling nigga-
alarms in the hearts and minds of a small cluster of Sheriff's deputies, provoking several to draw and
train their handguns on my head and torso. "Freeze" and "Get your hands up" were their
simultaneous but mutually contradictory commands-if you "freeze," of course, you cannot "get
your hands up"-but as I was about to share this snarky observation with my gun-wielding
interlocutors I noticed that the nearest one held his cocked firearm in a tremulous hand, a sign that he
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Self-defense claims illustrate how the substantive criminal law treats false
nigga alarms. Self-defense doctrine privileges both private citizens and police
personnel to use lethal defensive force against persons who reasonably appear to
pose an imminent threat of serious harm.66 The reach of this privilege to shoot
scary black males can be exceedingly long, as illustrated by cases like Bernard
Goetz, 67 Amadou Diallo,68 Sean Bell, 69 and Trayvon Martin. 70  Professors E.
was in the throes of an instinctive and fuel-injected fight-or-flight reaction. It struck me that despite
my grey beard and two sons in college, by standing 6'5", weighing two hundred pounds, and
brazenly brandishing nappyness from crown to jowl, I was to these armed and alarmed officers a
"big, black man" who "looked like a criminal." It turns out that here in the Good Negro capitol of
America, nappy performatives and celebrations of the African-American soul are worn at one's own
peril.
With "nigga alarms" wailing, me and my impertinent performative were patted down and
locked in the backseat of a police cruiser with the heavy-handed disrespect that is the common lot of
"suspect Niggas." As I peered through the police car partition cage, more deputies arrived, a
sharpshooter posted up across the street, and a phalanx of officers swept through our home with
drawn assault weapons. With implacable forces swirling around me, I inwardly moved toward the
quiet "eye" of this sudden tempest, that unruffled region at a storm's center about which winds rage
and rotate, but which itself remains calm. From this serene eye I gazed at the links between my own
rolling "prisoner transport cage" and those wrapped in concrete and barbed wire called correctional
institutions. In this stillness I heard echoes of long ago captivities-plantations brimming with blacks
in bondage--commingling with current-day captivities of both black inmates and law-abiding
Negroes who appear imminently dangerous to ordinary police officers equipped with guns and rolling
cages.
I was eventually told that someone had reported hearing a gunshot, although the way echoes
reverberate through these densely-populated hills, its location necessarily involved guesswork. As
the sweep uncovered no evidence of foul play, only the sole other occupants of the home in addition
to me, namely, a playful chocolate Lab and gray-flannel Weimaraner, with a certain detached
reflection I watched the deputies' "nigga alarm" sirens first deescalate into "nigga alert" honks, then
dissolve into "nigga advisory" drones, and finally melt into the melodious "safe-negro" warble that
for many years has been music to the ears of innocent but "suspicious" blacks. The door of my
custom built cage swung open as "Safe Negro" scrolled across their ticker tape displays and I
emerged like an Easter chick from its shell, stretching my legs and counting my blessings. Yet, had
the Deputy's surge of adrenaline made his trigger finger any twitchier, or had his stereotypes about
big, black men made it any itchier, our encounter could easily have ended not in a warble but a dirge.
66 The "serious harms" that typically justify lethal defensive force are death, serious bodily
injury, and rape. These justificatory grounds for self-defense involving deadly force have been
expanded in some jurisdictions to include robbery (as in the Bernhard Goetz case) and "standing your
ground" (as in Florida and other "stand your ground" jurisdictions that extend the "castle doctrine's"
privilege not to retreat when attacked in one's own home to public spaces). See e.g., F A STAT. § 776.012; People
v. Goelz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 46-48, 54 (N.Y. 1986); Cora Currier, 23 Other States Have 'Stand Your Ground'Laws,
Too, THE WmRE (Mar. 22, 2012, 4:20 PM), httpI/www.thewire.com/nationai2012/03/23-other-states-have-stand-
your-ground-laws-too/50226/.
67 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 41.
68 Precisely the same analysis applies to police officers, as illustrated by the case of Amadou
Diallo, the 22-year-old Guinean immigrant in New York City who was shot and killed in 1999 by
four New York City Police Department plain-clothed officers, who mistook his wallet for a gun and fired 41
shots, hitting Diallo nineteen times. Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, And an Unarned Man Is
Killed, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 5, 1999), httpV/www.nytimes.con/1999/02/05/nyregion/officers-in-bmnx-fire-4 1-shots-
and-an-unarmed-man-is-killed.html. The internal NYPD investigation ruled that the officers' mistaken beliefs
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Ashby Plant and B. Michelle Peruche have conducted experiments with police
officers which showed that officers were quicker to decide to shoot an unarmed
black target than a similarly situated unarmed white target. 7' Because such
discriminatory reactions often occur in the cognitive unconscious,72 bypassing the
actor's voluntary or conscious control, 73 racially liberal and well-meaning officers
(and ordinary citizens) arguably cannot help shooting ambiguous blacks more
hastily. Because self-defense doctrine excuses ordinary mistakes rooted in
ordinary human frailty, the law of self-defense thus allows ordinary police officers
and civilians alike to use lethal defensive force more hastily against ambiguous but
innocent blacks than against similarly situated whites. So long as ambiguous black
men make the trigger finger of ordinary citizens or law enforcement personnel
itchier or twitchier in uncertain situations than that finger would be for similarly
situated white men, more hasty applications of deadly force to black men will
qualify as reasonable and privileged. In the end, then, under current law, the
quicker use of lethal force against blacks by ordinary-hence reasonable-and
were reasonable under the circumstances, and a criminal jury acquitted them on the same grounds. See Jane
Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26,2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-
4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acqutted-all-charges.html. See also Alan Feuer, $3 Million Dollar Deal in Police
Killing of Diallo in'99, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/07/nyregion/3-miflion-deal-
in-police-killing-of-diallo-in-99.html ("The department accepted recommendations by two internal investigative
panels, which found that the officers, although they fired at an unarmed man, had not breached police guidelines
because they believed that Mr. Diallo held a weapon and that their lives were in danger.").
69 The Sean Bell shooting incident took place in Queens, New York on November 25,2006; three men
were shot a total of fifty times by a team of both plainclothes and undercover NYPD officers, killing one of the
men, Sean Bell, and severely wounding two of his friends, Trent Benefield and Joseph Guzman. Cara Buckley &
William K. Rashbaum, A Day After a Fatal Shooting Questions, Mourning and Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27,
2006), httpJ/www.nytimes.comt2006/11/27/nyregion/27shot.html. The incident sparked fierce criticism of the
police from some members of the public and drew comparisons to the killing of Diallo in 1999. Id Three of the
five detectives involved in the shooting went to trial on charges ranging from manslaughter to reckless
endangerment but were found not guilty. Not Guilty-Detectives Charged in Sean Bell Shooting Acquitted on All
Charges, N.Y.1 NEWS (Apr. 25, 2008), http://www.nyl.com/content/news/80881/not-guiltydetectives-charged-
in-sean-bell-shooting-acquitted-on-all-charges/. See also Michael Wilson, Judge Acquits Detectives in 50-Shot
Killing of Bell, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2008),
http'/www.nytimes.com/2008/04/26/nyregion/26bell.html?ref-nyregion.
70 See Greg Botelho & Holly Yan, George Zinmeran found not guilty of murder in Trayvon Martin's
Death, CNN (July 14,2013, 11:50 AM), http'/www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/justice/zimmefnan-trial/.
71 SAUL KASSrN, STEvEN FEIN & HAZEL ROSE MARKUS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 185 (7th ed.
2007) (citing E. Ashby Plant & Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers"
Responses to Criminal Subjects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 181-82 (2005)). That the targets were
unarmed makes it clear that we are focusing on mistakes and excuses rather than justifications.
What's more, subjects were also quicker to decide to shoot an armed black target than a similarly
situated armed white target. Id.
72 Jody D. Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv 733, 738 (1995).
73 Id.
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well-meaning police officers and private citizens is an inexorable expression of the
Black Tax that black men must simply grin and bear without civil compensation
74
or criminal vindication.75
ii. On Race, Place, Class, Crime, and Profiling
Allow me a brief side note. Interestingly, instead of criticizing the use of such
profiling, of what I term the general deployment of a Nigga Detector, many in the
black community critique only its unfair use on them. It is not the Nigga Detector
they object to, but rather the fact that it is still too blunt an instrument, not
sufficiently calibrated to exclude all good negroes. These critics add that the
disproportionate misdeeds of bad niggas hurt the interests of good law-abiding
Negroes by providing the statistical justification for the "Black Tax." As Ellis
Cose chronicles in The Rage of a Privileged Class, the Black Tax is the bane of the
existence of the black bourgeoisie and one big reason black Brahmans feel so
enraged.76  Indifferent as lightning, the Black Tax strikes both black haves and
black have-nots, both good and bad Negroes. But unlike natural lightning, which
in myth never strikes twice in the same place, bolts of Black Tax lightning
repeatedly strike the same targets again and again. This phenomenon is shown by
a Community Service Society of New York's analysis of 2009 stop-and-frisk data
for the New York police: there were 132,000 stops of black men 16-24 in 2009 (94
percent of which did not lead to an arrest).77 According to Census Bureau data,
only 120,000 black men of that age lived in New York City in 2009!78 Thus, "on
average, every young black man can be expected to be stopped and frisked by the
police each year., 79  Put differently, young black men in New York are law-
74 Self-defense is a privilege to a battery claim in tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 63 (1965). We could recognize strict liability in tort for reasonable mistakes about the need for
deadly defensive force; specifically, we could adopt the logic of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co.,
109 Minn. 456, 459 (1910) and hold that a deliberate appropriation of another's well-being to
promote and protect one's own interests triggers a duty to compensate the injured party even though
the injurer acted reasonably and was in no way at fault. Alternatively, perhaps we could think of law
enforcement as an ultra-hazardous activity subject to strict liability vis-A-vis innocent blacks in light
of demonstrable unconscious bias.
75 However, unlike strict tort liability, legally vindicating innocent victims of reasonable
mistakes through imposing strict criminal liability on their injurers would be impossible without
fundamentally violating the culpability principle that is the cornerstone of our criminal jurisprudence.
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) ("The contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.... A relation
between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to.').
76 See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 95 (1993).
77 Lazar Treschan, Letter to the Editor, Police Stop-and-Frisks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011),
www.nytimes.com/2011/1 2/30/opinion/police-stop-and-frisks.html.
78 Id.
79 id.
[Vol 12:9
NIGGA THEORY
enforcement lightning rods who can expect to be struck over and over by blue
surge bolts of Black Tax lightning.
Some privileged blacks would not find the Black Tax so infuriating if it were
more targeted, tailored, and regressive, that is, more limited to poor blacks, whose
disproportionate misdeeds establish and maintain the statistical link between race
and crime in the first place. Black Brahmin icon, Bill Cosby, stressed the class
factor in his address at the NAACP on the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education: "Ladies and Gentlemen, the lower economic and lower middle
economic people are not holding their end in this deal." 80 Statistically at least,
these better off critics of poor blacks have a point: the vast majority of black street
criminals are from "extremely" disadvantaged neighborhoods. 81  From this
statistical perspective, by committing street crimes at such disproportionately high
rates, "poor black criminals" make blackness itself, in the language of evidence
law, relevant evidence of criminal wrongdoing or criminal intent. The
disproportionate misdeeds of poor blacks-to paraphrase the evidence code-
make the proposition that someone did or will do a crime statistically more likely
to be true given his blackness than it would be without that factor. This cold but
cogent math--chiefly bottomed on the criminal wrongdoing of blacks from truly
disadvantaged neighborhoods-has prompted my Black Beverly Hills neighbors to
openly declare "We don't want Compton up here"; in eerily similar language it
also prompted an L.A. County Sheriff's Deputy to warn an event planner that "We
80 Bill Cosby, Address at the NAACP on the 50th Anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education, at Constitution Hall, Washington D.C. (May 17, 2004), available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/billcosbypoundcakespeech.htm. Cosby's speech is often
called the "Pound Cake" speech because of the following lines in which he drives a sharp and deep
wedge between morally "innocent" victims of Jim Crow and their champions ("the ones up here in
the balcony"), on the one hand, and morally culpable common black criminals, on the other:
But these people, the ones up here in the balcony fought so hard. Looking at the
incarcerated, these are not political criminals. These are people going around stealing
Coca-Cola. People getting shot in the back of the head over a piece of pound cake! And
then we all run out and are outraged, "The cops shouldn't have shot him." What the hell
was he doing with the pound cake in his hand? I wanted a piece of pound cake just as
bad as anybody else, and I looked at it and I had no money. And something called
parenting said, "If you get caught with it you're going to embarrass your mother." Not
"You're going to get your butt kicked." No. "You're going to embarrass your family."
Id. Note that the socially conservative but popular position Cosby expresses here flatly rejects, on
moral grounds, Michelle Alexander's contention that the mass incarceration of black criminals
constitutes a form of unwarranted social and political oppression analogous to Jim Crow. See
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
81 See generally Krivo & Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban
Crime, supra note 35; Krivo & Peterson, The Structural Context of Homicide, supra note 35;
Peterson & Krivo, Macrostructural Analyses of Race, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime, supra note 35;
Peterson & Krivo, Race, Residence, and Violent Crime: A Structure of Inequality, supra note 35.
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don't want South Central up here."8 2  The cogent math linking extremely
disadvantaged black neighborhoods and violent crime means that, from the
perspective of these good negroes, someone from such a neighborhood should pose
a much greater risk of serious street crime than his Golden Ghetto doppelganger8 3
These good negroes thus embrace something akin to a mapping of the link between
race, place, class, and crime, something akin to a "nigga geography" or "nigga
cartography., 8 4  Not surprisingly, there's an app for that-a service originally
launched under the name "Ghetto Tracker" and relying on crowd sourced
information (locals rate which parts of town are safe and which ones are ghetto, or
unsafe) to help people avoid unsafe areas. 85
For these good negroes, the Nigga Detector would be less blunt and more
finely calibrated if it also included a Ghetto Tracker. For these good negroes,
"class" and "place" profiling--"spatial profiling"--is perfectly rational,
reasonable, and right. They can echo defenders of racial profiling and say, with
the cool precision of Mr. Spock or Data, "it is regrettable but rational to profile on
the basis of geography-nothing personal. As long as there remains a statistically
rational relationship between extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods and
violence, we cannot escape the logical link between geography and dangerousness.
Simply put, we must distinguish and distance ourselves from Jungle-South
Central-Compton-Inglewood-Watts blacks because doing so enhances our safety;
it's not about race or class but safety-again, nothing personal. 86  Thus an
82 I, along with Eddie Harris (former Santa Monica police officer) and Chris Cuben (producer
and event planner), witnessed the Sheriff's remarks.
83 What's more, inasmuch as black criminals are morally condemnable, then, by hypothesis,
not only are denizens of truly disadvantaged neighborhoods more dangerous, they are also much
more often morally condemnable; in other words, they are morally suspect. Put differently, under the
Black Criminal Litmus Test of a morally condemnable "nigga," it turns out that the moral boundary
that runs between law-abiding "black people" and wicked "niggas" tightly tracks the geographical
boundaries between black haves and have-nots.
84 Massey and Denton have argued and shown that residential segregation serves to channel
the racial inequality in rewards (e.g., high income) and disadvantages (e.g., poverty) evident in a
racially stratified society into distinct neighborhood environments. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 122-23
(1993).
85 Heather Kelly, Ghetto Tracker Site Offends, Dies and Returns, CNN (Sep. 6, 2013, 5:17 PM),
httpJ/www.cnn.comi2Ol3/09/06/tech/web/ghetto-tracker-controversy/; Lydia O'Connor, 'Ghetto Tracker,' App
That Helps Rich Avoid Poor, Is as Bad as It Sounds, THE HuFFINGTON POST (Sept 5, 2013, 4:50 PM),
http'/www.huffingtonposcom/2013/09/04/ghetto-tracker_n 3869051.hlnl. Ghetto Tracker's ratings of
neighborhoods werent based on any hard crime data but rather on the impressions (and perhaps biases) of
ordinary people. Would Ghetto Trackers remain objectionable if they changed the name-say, to "Good Part of
Town," as was done by the site founder-and rested the ratings on hard data? In the words of the site
owner, "This website is not about race or income, as some of the PC myrmidons have asserted ....
Again, it's about safety." Kelly, supra.
86 I call such black apologetics for spatially profiling other blacks "talking white"--deploying
the same arguments against poor blacks to justify class profiling that whites use against blacks to
justify racial profiling. Hypocrisy seeps through these class-based discriminations, however. In
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enraged "privileged class" that rails against too blunt racial profiling itself
routinely practices spatial profiling without compunction or even a hint of irony.
iii. The Black Tax as a Tithe That Binds
Allow me another side note. Although I have attacked the Black Tax in
books, 87 blogs, 88 and law reviews, 89 a silver lining runs through it. To appreciate
the consolation I find in racial profiling, start with the well-supported empirical
premise that extreme disadvantage breeds street crime. Then add the observation
that so long as truly disadvantaged blacks continue to disproportionately commit
street crime, their disproportionate misdeeds will continue to statistically justify
the use of a Nigga Detector and the resulting Black Tax, and generate the false
nigga warnings that rankle and enrage the privileged class. Now add the
recognition that more sophisticated Nigga Detectors will never adequately reduce
the false warnings visited upon the enraged class of privileged blacks. The silver-
lining implication of these three propositions is that the only way for enraged black
Brahmins to pay or sing less of the Black Tax 9° blues is to destroy its statistical
foundation by lifting poor blacks out of extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods,
fixing their crumbling schools, and addressing other criminogenic social
conditions that besiege them. In fact, whenever members of the black bourgeoisie
are struck by bolts of Black Tax lightning (whenever, say, they nearly get tennis
elbow from trying to flag down cabs that won't stop), their rage should give way to
a "moment of Zen"-they should reflect on reasons for the sometimes cogent
Rage of a Privileged Class, Ellis Cose chronicles the seething festering resentment of many in the
black bourgeoisie whose socio-economic privilege provides no immunity to a steady barrage of
indignities and micro-aggressions rooted in racial stereotypes and suspicions. See COSE, supra note
76, at 11-14. Yet this righteous rage over racial profiling rings hollow when that same privileged
class practices spatial profiling against other blacks. Black-on-black spatial profiling cannot be
justified any more than white-on-black racial profiling. Teens from poor black neighborhoods have
no more control over the class they were born into than members of the black bourgeoisie have over
their skin pigment. Kids and teens are not poor because they are bad anymore than people are black
because they are bad, so neither poor black teens nor privileged black adults can control the social
characteristic profilers use against them.
87 See Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 64, as reprinted in KADiSH ET AL., supra note
6, at 826-27; id, as reprinted in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CurING EDGE 180 (Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013); see ARMOUR, supra note 62.
88 See David Schraub, Blogging in Full Armour (Sept. 13, 2006),
http://firstmovers.blogspot.com/2006/09/blogging-in-full-armour.html (discussing Jody David
Armour, West Coast Nigga Thinking Parts I-IV (on file with author)).
89 Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 64, at 782-83.
90 The Black Brahmin Blues-the genre of the Black Tax Blues sung by View Park
Negroes--could go something like this:
Black Tax rising, despite my degrees I can't buy no relief
I said, Black Tax rising, despite my degrees I don't get no relief
Blue surge bolts of Black Tax lightning don't respect my good Negro pedigree.
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statistical disparities in rates of crime by race that can be advanced to justify racial
profiling and its attendant indignities, namely, the hopelessness, frustration,
alienation, and despair of truly disadvantaged blacks stranded in neighborhoods
abandoned long ago by the "privileged class" itself.9' The relatively law-abiding
black bourgeoisie should view the Black Tax as a "tithe" that binds their fate to
that of extremely disadvantaged blacks, a relentless reminder that as long as "they"
don't look good, "we" don't look good. That is the silver lining, at least in theory.
iv. The Blaming System: Weighing Wickedness
Next, consider the Nigga Detector's blaming system, the primary focus of this
essay and of the substantive criminal law. When aimed at a black person who has
already committed a prohibited act or actus reus (for instance, a black defendant in
a criminal trial who clearly caused a death or some other serious social harm), the
Detector no longer needs drones, honks, or sirens to warn of the risk of someone
committing a prohibited act. At this point, the risk of wrongdoing has been
realized-the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed a wrongful act. So in this phase of its operation, the Detector shifts
from assessing someone's riskiness, suspiciousness, and dangerousness to
assessing his moral fault, blameworthiness, and subjective culpability. 92 Since the
sole function of the Detector's blaming system is to assess a black wrongdoer's
wickedness, its operation and application raises concerns commonly couched in
terms of "mens rea" (i.e. "criminal intents," "vicious wills" and "depraved
hearts"), "individual choice," "personal responsibility" and "substantive criminal
law." Once again, the Detector's assessments of a wrongdoer's wickedness or
mens rea reflect the moral judgments, perceptions and beliefs of ordinary men and
women. 
93
91 See WILSON, supra note 52; Kucheva & Sander, supra note 52.
92 The wrongdoer's "character" can influence both the warning and blaming judgments of fact
finders. "Character" as propensity to commit a crime in the evidentiary sense can be seen as relevant
to the warning system. The "character" part of subjective culpability and mens rea analysis is also
relevant to the blaming system. Evidence of a defendant's character to prove propensity and hence to
prove he committed the actus reus is generally screened out of criminal adjudications. However,
drawing inferences of bad character traits from the commission of an actus reus or prohibited act is,
as George Fletcher points out, a standard part of mens rea analysis. GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 799-800 (1978).
93 Many black commentators and decision makers who criticize ordinary, widespread,
"common sense" beliefs about blacks when it comes to the Detector's warning system nevertheless
warmly embrace such beliefs when it comes to its blaming system. When it comes to the warning
system's race-based predictions and risk assessments (that is, when it comes to the Black Tax), the
interests of disproportionately privileged law-abiding blacks and those of disproportionately poor
black criminals converge more, making it easy for privileged black scholars, commentators, and
ordinary people to energetically attack a harmful social practice-like that of racial profiling-that
falls especially hard on poor black males trapped in aggressively policed low income neighborhoods.
However, when it comes to other harmful social practices that especially hurt poor black males-like
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So, when aimed at a black who has already committed a wrongful act, the
Detector activates a flashing red "Presumptive Nigga" light while broadcasting the
click-clack sound of double barrel hammers cocking in rapid succession. This
cocking sound acoustically represents the typical or ordinary inference that
someone who commits a wrongful act is wicked, so it acoustically represents our
readiness to condemn and ostracize the wrongdoer if and when he fails to refute
that ordinary inference of subjective culpability. 94 As Professor George Fletcher
observes, if someone commits a prohibited act-say, a jewelry store clerk opens a
safe and turns over all the jewels to an unauthorized stranger, or a driver runs over
someone lying in the street, or a State Department employee turns over vital state
secrets to a foreign government-we typically infer from his wrongful act that he
is wickedly dishonest, indifferent, or greedy. 95 More succinctly, we typically infer
a bad actor from a bad act. 96 In this sense, someone who commits a prohibited act
is presumptively blameworthy. And this is particularly true of black wrongdoers,
in part because of the implicit biases we all have. Accordingly, when the Detector
is aimed at a black wrongdoer, it scrolls "Prima Facie Nigga" across its display
along with an acoustic cascade of click-clacks.
Of course, this typical inference of culpability or presumptive wickedness can
be defeated. If the clerk, the driver, and the State Department employee commit
their prohibited acts at gunpoint, we cannot infer from their wrongful act anything
about their dishonesty, indifference, or greed. All three could claim a full excuse
of duress.9 7 Excuses, in the words of George Fletcher, "preclude an inference from
our blame and punishment practices-the interests of disproportionately privileged law-abiding
blacks and those of disproportionately poor black wrongdoers in critical ways diverge, making it
easier for Good Negroes to energetically endorse "lock 'em up and throw away the key" approaches
toward their "bad 'brothers."'
94 This presumption of subjective culpability or mens rea may seem at odds with the
"presumption of innocence" guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged."). Compare Patterson v. New York, which seems to
permit legislators to make mens rea factors affirmative defenses and hence shift the burden of proof
on those matters of guilt and innocence to the accused. 432 U.S. 197, 225-32 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). That is, assuming that Due Process requires the state to prove that the defendant
committed a prohibited act beyond a reasonable doubt, the state may then shift to the defendant the
burden of proving his moral innocence, of proving that his act was not accompanied by intent or any
other form of mens rea. Id. So characterizing someone who commits a prohibited act as
presumptively blameworthy would not necessarily violate the soft, anemic presumption of innocence
recognized in Patterson. Id.
" FLETCHER, supra note 9.
96 Id.
97 Model Penal Code would allow a duress excuse for someone who ran over another person
with a gun at his head, but most courts would not allow the excuse for the intentional taking of
human life. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09(2) cmt. 3 at 375-78 (1985).
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the act to the actor's character." 98  But can a Prima Facie Nigga destroy the
ordinary inference of wickedness that accompanies wrongdoing by raising or
interposing a valid excuse?
A wrongdoer may be unable to assert a valid excuse either because the law
does not recognize the kind of excuse he wants to assert or because the jury does
not think he deserves the benefit of an excuse the law does recognize. In either
case, without an effective excuse, he will be found wicked beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, when the Detector points toward a black wrongdoer unable to
raise a valid excuse and hence found wicked beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury,
the Detector scrolls "real Nigga" across its ticker while acoustically broadcasting
the Blam-Blam of the distinguish and distance barrels discharging twin rounds of
Bad Negro buckshot.
v. An Illustration-Application-Demonstration: The Reasonable Poor
Black Man Test of Mens Rea
To see the Detector tools in action, let's apply the apparatus thus far to the
longstanding debate over broad excuses for black criminals from disadvantaged
social backgrounds. Of course, any analysis of criminal excuses must begin with a
prohibited act or actus reus-like causing death or giving away vital state secrets.99
Again, blacks who commit such prohibited acts trigger the Detector's cascading
click-clacks and scrolling "Prima Facie Nigga" ticker.
At this point a prima facie bad Negro can seek to assert either a broad partial
excuse like provocation and "extreme emotional disturbance"' 00 or a broad full
excuse like duress and self-defense. In claims of provocation and extreme
emotional disturbance, a wrongdoer is partially excused if a "reasonable person in
the situation" would have been sorely tempted to lose self-control; in duress and
self-defense, he is fully excused if a "reasonable person" (i.e. a person of average
courage, firmness and backbone) in the wrongdoer's situation" would have been
overwhelmed by the threats or apparent threats. So both kinds of excuse' 0' turn
crucially on the "reasonable person in the situation" test of subjective
98 FLETCHER, supra note 92, at 798-99 (claiming that something about the wrongdoer's
circumstances drove a wedge between his true self and the contingent self who committed the
prohibited act or more concisely they claim that their wrongdoing was the result of ordinary human
frailty).
99 Accordingly, excuse claims involve the Detector's "blaming system," not its "warning
system." Of course, failure to act when under a duty to act also constitutes an act.
100 I know that provocation doctrine can be narrowly limited to a few adequate forms, but I'm
following the Maher line of cases that allow most claims of provocation to reach the jury subject to
the judge playing the role of gatekeeper. See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862).
101 Other fully exculpatory excuse claims include criminal negligence and criminal
recklessness: Sanford Kadish rightly views negligence and recklessness as "excuses in mens rea
clothing." Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 260-61 (1997).
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culpability.10 2 Thus, the reasonable person test provides judges and jurors with a
flexible legal vehicle by which they can excuse a wrongdoer on the moral ground
that his circumstances, in the words of Mark Kelman, drove a wedge between his
"contingent" self-the self that came forward under the unjust pressures of the
situation in which he found himself-and some underlying "true" self that could
have manifested itself and maintained control if not for those unjust pressures. 103
The "reasonable or ordinary person in the situation" test of wickedness 10 4 can
be either rigid and "invariant"' 10 5 (i.e. a typical person drawn from the general
population, average in mental, emotional, psychological and dispositional make
up) or flexible and "individualized" (a typical person drawn from a social
subgroup, like a typical battered woman or a typical person suffering from a post-
traumatic stress disorder or a typical impoverished, poorly educated and
chronically unemployed person). Whether the test is invariant or individualized, 10 6
the underlying question of legal excuses can be distilled to this: "Should the
'reasonable person in the situation' test of blameworthiness in cases of duress and
extreme emotional disturbance be individualized to make allowances for the
wrongdoer's disadvantaged social background?" Alternatively, in instructing on
the reasonable person standard: "Should courts instruct jurors on an 'ordinary
102 Jurors excuse or condemn on the basis of this decision rule. Decision rules are addressed to
the fact finder and guide their judgments of defendant at trial; conduct rules are addressed to the
general public and guide their behavior as citizens outside the courtroom. See Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1984); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729
(1990).
103 Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 798, 802
(1991). As Martin Wasik puts it, in cases of duress "the accused claims that there was no act by
him." Martin Wasik, Duress and Criminal Responsibility, CRIM. L. REV. 453, 453 (1977); see also
State v. Woods, 357 N.E.2d 1059, 1066 (Ohio 1976) ("The essential characteristic of coercion ... is
that force, threat of force, strong persuasion or domination by another, necessitous circumstances, or
some combination of those, has overcome the mind or volition of the defendant so that he acted other
than he ordinarily would have acted in the absence of those influences."), vacated in part, 438 U.S.
910, 910 (1978), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Downs, 364 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (Ohio
1977), vacated in part, 438 U.S. 909 (1978). By this logic, we must ascertain a wrongdoer's true
character before we can justly blame him, and the reasonable person test provides the legal basis for
jurors to assess his blameworthiness by either attributing his misdeeds to his "contingent self' and
thus excusing him or attributing them to his "true" self-to an inner depravity, malignity and
wickedness-and thus condemning him.
104 Some contend that the reasonable person test is a form of strict liability that does not get at
subjective culpability like the aware mental state forms of mens rea do. This claim is not supported
by the case law and substantive doctrine. GLAVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART 122-23 (2d ed. 1961) (cited and quoted in KADISH ET AL., supra note 24 at 423).
105 HART, supra note 14, at 153-54.
106 Which one it is depends on case law, the trial judge, and even the legislature (in self-
defense law, for instance, legislatures have required courts to recognize evidence of battered
women's syndrome, essentially requiring courts to individualize the reasonable person test in such
cases). See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.6.
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impoverished black man trapped behind ghetto walls' test of reasonableness in
claims of putative self-defense, duress, provocation, or extreme emotional
distress?" Bear in mind that, at bottom, the "reasonable person in the situation"
approach to excuses and subjective culpability depends on jury sympathy. In the
words of a Model Penal Code Comment on the reasonable person test in
provocation cases, "[i]n the end, the question is whether the actor's loss of self-
control can be understood in terms that arouse sympathy in the ordinary
citizen."10 7 Sympathy, or its absence, drives our moral judgments of wrongdoers at
least as much as-if not far more than-reason or logic or categorical
imperatives. 0 8 "Nigga" from this standpoint is a conclusory label that the object
of assessment inspires no sympathy in the observer, commentator or decision
maker: individuals are not unsympathetic because they are bad Negroes, they are
bad Negroes because they are unsympathetic. 10 9
2. Excuse Deflector
The above illustration brings me to the remaining components of the
Ostracizer apparatus, beginning with the Excuse Deflector. In seeking to assert
excuses based on duress, heat of passion, or an individualized reasonable person
test, our posited wrongdoer activates the Nigga Detector's built-in Excuse
Deflector, which deflects excuses for blacks on moral, legal, psychological, and
political grounds.
i. Morally
The Excuse Deflector brushes aside excuses on two often heard grounds.
First, in keeping with the widespread view that sympathy for wrongdoers in
criminal matters is misplaced, the Deflector channels sympathy away from the
human frailty of the wrongdoer and solely toward the terrible suffering of his
victims.110 From this standpoint, sympathy for victims flatly trumps that for
107 See KADISH ET AL., supra note 6, at 459 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES,
§ 210.3 cmt. at 62-63 (1980) (emphasis added). The Model Penal Code states this in the setting of
the Extreme Emotional Distress defense, but it applies equally to self-defense, duress, recklessness
and negligence. Id.
108 Inasmuch as condemnation of and sympathy for wrongdoers pull in opposite directions, this
issue of how individualized to make the standard of care really boils down to what exculpatory or
mitigating factors jurors will hear about in reaching their decision on whether to withhold or give
sympathy.
109 More generally, individuals are not unsympathetic because they are wicked. They are
wicked because they are unsympathetic.
110 See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339-40, 1354, 1365-66 (1997) (concluding that the Model Penal
Code's formulation has aggravated the unfairness to women of the provocation defense by expanding
greatly the kinds of frictions in intimate settings that may suffice to reduce a killing from murder to
manslaughter). Of course, excuse claims will not persuade judges, jurors and laypeople who
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victimizers. Second, in keeping with another widespread viewpoint, the Deflector
brushes aside most excuses for black criminals on the ground that excuses insult
the dignity of their intended beneficiaries-black criminals-by treating them like
animals or things or Pavlovian bundles of conditioned reflexes rather than as
persons, that is, as moral agents capable of meaningful choice.11 Both these
classic and oft-repeated reasons for rejecting most excuses (even limited and long-
standing excuses like heat of passion on sudden provocation) are captured in the
following comment by Professor Stephen Morse:
I would abolish [the provocation defense] and convict all intentional
killers of murder. Reasonable people do not kill no matter how much
they are provoked, and even enraged people generally retain the capacity
to control homicidal or any other kind of aggressive antisocial desires.
We cheapen both life and our conception of responsibility by
maintaining the provocation/passion mitigation. This may seem harsh
and contrary to the supposedly humanitarian reforms of the evolving
criminal law. But this . . . interpretation of criminal law history is
morally mistaken. It is humanitarian only if one focuses sympathetically
on perpetrators and not on their victims, and views the former as mostly
helpless objects of their overwhelming emotions and irrationality. This
sympathy is misplaced, however, and is disrespecful to the perpetrator.
As virtually every human being knows because we all have been
enraged, it is easy not to kill, even when one is enraged. 1
12
ii. Legally
For reasons like those expressed by Professor Morse, the Deflector turns aside
all but a few narrowly framed legal excuses, like involuntary act, maybe limited
insanity, maybe very limited duress, 1 3 and no provocation or extreme emotional
commiserate solely with the suffering of victims. From this standpoint, sympathy for victims trumps
sympathy for victimizers, even though from a broader frame of reference, the victimizers can be seen
as victims, too. This victim-centered approach is incident-focused and begins the narrative with the
crime. Like critiques of torts and contract law, the critique of this approach is that it ignores
background inequalities in the formulation and application of its rules of decision and in the
normative assessment of those decision rules; changes in the status quo ante are all that are
considered.
"l My moral luck analysis in my forthcoming book embraces rather than flees this charge.
See ARMOUR, supra note 22.
112 Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33-34 (1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
113 See ARMOUR, supra note 62, at 92-94.
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disturbance. 14  Many courts arbitrarily-from the standpoint of the culpability
principle-limit the scope of excuse claims as a matter of law so that wrongdoers
never get to present them to a jury. 115 The Deflector reflects and gives effect to
these artificial legal limitations on what kinds of extenuating factors a wrongdoer
can get before a jury to potentially arouse their sympathy.
iii. Psychologically
The Deflector more readily rejects and deflects excuses for black wrongdoers
than for white ones in order to reflect the role of unconscious bias in moral
114 See Morse, supra note 112; see also Nourse, supra note 110, at 1331-34 (contending that
provocation and EED doctrines redound to the detriment of female assault victims and so should be
severely circumscribed or abolished).
115 For instance, the commentary to Section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code explains the
operation of duress doctrine with the following illustration:
(a) X is unwillingly driving a car along a narrow and precipitous mountain road, falling
off sharply on both sides, under the command of Y, an armed escaping felon. The
headlights pick out two persons, apparently and actually drunk, lying across the road in
such a position as to make passage impossible without running them over. X is prevented
from stopping by the threat of Y to shoot him dead if he declines to drive straight on. If
X does go on and kills the drunks in order to save himself he will be excused [under
duress doctrine] if the jury should find that "a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist," although he would not be justified under the
lesser evil principle of [necessity doctrine].
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09(2) cmt. 3 at 378 (1985).
X's choice in this hypothetical situation to kill the people lying across the road rather than
sacrifice himself is deemed to be determined. However, courts strictly cabin the duress defense by
requiring that the defendant face immediate and specific threats, usually of death or severe bodily
injury, and that the threats come from specific human agents who seek to compel the defendant to
commit the particular crime for which he is charged. The Model Penal Code illustrates the
incoherence (from the moral standpoint of his deserts) of these restrictions on the duress defense in
the following variation on their earlier hypothetical:
(b) The same situation as above except that X is prevented from stopping by suddenly
inoperative brakes. His alternatives are either to run down the drunks or to run off the
road and down the mountainside. If X chooses the first alternative to save his own life
and kills the drunks he will not be excused under [duress doctrine] even if a jury should
find that a person of reasonable fortitude would have been unable to do otherwise.
Id. (emphasis added).
From the standpoint of the defendant's blameworthiness, it is impossible to distinguish between
these two hypothetical situations. By hypothesis, even if a reasonable person could not have avoided
doing exactly what the defendant did, he must be legally condemned because of morally irrelevant
doctrinal limitations. From the standpoint of the culpability principle, the following distinction
between the two cases offered in the commentary to the Model Penal Code is embarrassingly beside
the point: "In the former situation, the basic interests of the law may be satisfied by prosecution of the
agent of unlawiul force; in the latter circumstance, if the actor is excused, no one is subject to the
law's applica ion." Id. at 379.
Also in keeping with conservative formulations of the black letter law, the Deflector deflects
excuses peculiar to someone's social subgroup by using only an invariant or so-called "objective"
reasonable person test and rejecting an individualized one.
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judgments of blacks by ordinary people. Studies on unconscious discrimination-
both in the form of attribution bias' 16 and in-group empathy bias' -show that
ordinary people are more likely to reject excuses for blacks than for similarly
situated whites.
iv. Politically
The Deflector rejects excuses because successful ones gum up both barrels of
the Ostracizer's double barreled distinguish and distance "them" from "us"
response to black criminals.' 18 Full excuses like duress clog up the "distinguish"
barrel by making it impossible to "differentiate" the character of blacks who
commit prohibited acts from those who do not; partial excuses like provocation
clog up the "distance" barrel by reducing murder to manslaughter and hence
reducing the moral distance between an intentional killer and the law-abiding rest
of us. 19 By deflecting most excuses for black wrongdoers, the Deflector keeps
both barrels of the double-barreled anti-lumping political reaction to black
criminals unclogged and ready. 2 0
116 In a classic experiment, Birt Duncan showed white subjects a videotape depicting one
person (either black or white) ambiguously shoving another (either black or white). Birt L. Duncan,
Differential Social Perception and Attributes of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of
Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595-97 (1976). Subjects who
characterized the shove as "violent" more frequently attributed the wrongdoing to personal,
dispositional causes when the harm-doer was black, but to situational causes when the harm-doer was
white. Id. A recent study of juvenile offenders found a pronounced difference in court officials'
attributions about the causes of crime by black versus white youths: Court officials are significantly
more likely to perceive blacks' crimes as caused by internal factors and crimes committed by whites
as caused by external ones. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official
Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc.
REV. 554, 557, 561 (1998). In the words of the researchers, "[b]eing black significantly reduces the
likelihood of negative external attributions by probation officers and significantly increases the
likelihood of negative internal attributions, even after adjusting for severity of the presenting offense
and the youth's prior involvement in criminal behavior." Id. at 563-64.
117 Jennifer N. Gutsell & Michael Inzlicht, Empathy Constrained: Prejudice Predicts Reduced
Mental Simulation of Actions During Observation of Outgroups, J. ExP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 841, 842
(2010); Vani A Mathur et al., Neural Basis of Extraordinary Empathy and Altruistic Motivation, 51
NEUROIMAGE 1468, 1468 (2010).
118 Part of the political reason for distinguishing and distancing good and bad Negroes is to
look better in the eyes of whites and enhance our racial reputation. KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 17.
This kind of political rationale will apply to cases of minorities who must care about their subgroup's
reputation. But a more general political reason for a "distinguish and distance" approach to
wrongdoers may be the need for proponents of "law and order," retribution, stiffer sentencing, and
more prisons to maximize the contempt and indignation stirred by the objects of the longer sentences
and harsher treatment that they advocate.
119 What's more, successful excuses clog both barrels by focusing attention on the human
frailty of wrongdoers and inviting decision makers to show them sympathy as well as their victims.
120 Accordingly, Good Negro Theory and its proponents must assume that there is a stark
dichotomy, a "sharp" distinction, between criminals and non-criminals.
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3. Double Barreled Distinguish and Distance Device
Once the Deflector has rejected the excuse claims of most black wrongdoers,
the resulting absence of valid excuses means the jury will confirm the Detector's
prima facie readings by finding the wrongdoer a blameworthy bad Negro beyond a
reasonable doubt, thereby triggering the implacable BLAM-BLAM of the
distinguish and distance barrels while the words "Real Nigga" scroll across their
collective electronic ticker display.
4. Good Negro Code of Ethics
Because the Detector-the conceptual and operational embodiment of the
Black Criminal Litmus Test of a Nigga-rejects most excuses for black criminals,
any racial justice advocate who "makes excuses" for such odious creatures violates
the Ostracizer's Good Negro Code of Ethics, under which ethical advocates must
remain faithful to the kind of "morality of means" 121 that inspired Justice Marshall
to refuse to make excuses for "thuggery when perpetrated by blacks. 122 In other
words, for Good Negro Theory, distinguishing and distancing good and bad
Negroes is an ethical obligation, one that imposes ethical limits on how racial
justice advocates should treat black criminals and approach criminal matters.
Under Good Negro Ethics, racial justice advocates who fail to morally and legally
distinguish and distance black criminals from law-abiding blacks breach their most
basic duty to help rather than hurt Black People.
For convenience, let me emphasize that I am using the term "Good Negro" to
refer to law-abiding blacks who "ethically" wield whatever influence they have in
criminal matters to sharply distinguish morally and legally between black law
abiders (other good negroes) and black criminals (bad niggas). Thus, there can be
Good Negro Presidents, Senators, Attorneys General, Judges, and Jurors. Good
Negro Sheriffs, District Attorneys, Parole Board Members and Probation Officers.
Good Negro Scholars, Bloggers and Pundits.123 And finally, there can be Good
Negro Associations and Advocates, like the NAACP under Thurgood Marshall,
124
dedicated to ethically advancing the social interests of African Americans in
criminal matters through strategies that "sharply distinguish" between Good and
Bad Negroes.125 From the standpoint of Good Negro Ethics, black activists must
not defend black criminals, for it hurts Black People when racial justice advocates
carry briefs for niggas.
121 KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 20.
122 Id. at21.
123 Even Good Negro Ordinary Citizens-a category encompassing ordinary blacks who, for
instance, eschew public displays of solidarity with black criminals. Id.
124 See id. at 20-21.
125 And these strategies also maximize the distance between them in the eyes of whites.
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5. Good Negro Cost-Benefit Wealth-Maximizing Moral Compass
Finally, according to the cost-benefit moral compass of the Ostracizer,
26
excuses-such as an "ordinary impoverished black man trapped behind ghetto
walls" test of the "reasonable man"-are bad policy for blacks as a group because
excuses keep criminal wrongdoers, including drug dealers, users, and gangbangers,
out of jail and on the street, where they can claim more mostly black victims. In
short, "A thug in prison can't shoot your sister."' 127 Good Negro legal scholar
Randall Kennedy puts it this way: "[i]n terms of misery inflicted by direct criminal
violence," blacks "suffer more from the criminal acts of their racial 'brothers' and
'sisters' than they do from the racist misconduct of white police officers."' 128 This
wry remark may very well be true. It is not hard to imagine that a given Black
gangbanger could inflict more pain and suffering on other blacks than a given
bigot with a badge and a gun. 129 It may even be true that, to quote another Good
Negro commentator, "Racist white cops, however vicious, are ultimately minor
irritants when compared to the viciousness of the black gangs and wanton
126 To settle conflicts of interests between subdivisions, do what maximizes the general
welfare of the Black community. Of course, criticisms of black criminals are partly rooted in notions
of personal responsibility, choice, free will, just deserts, and retribution, and partly rooted in
utilitarian notions of welfare maximization. Because my discussions elsewhere of moral luck and
unconscious bias in judging the just deserts of black wrongdoers will destroy the "personal
responsibility" and "individual choice" bases for distinguishing between Good and Bad Negroes, not
a principle of justice but rather the welfare principle will be the only remaining plausible normative
support for Good Negro Theory.
127 John J. Dilulio, Jr., Prisons Are a Bargain, by Any Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at
A17, reprinted in KADISH, supra note 24, at 102. According to Dilulio, research shows "it costs
society at least twice as much to let a prisoner loose than to lock him up." Id. As proof that "prisons
pay big dividends," Dilulio cites Patrick Langan's calculation that "tripling the prison population
from 1975 to 1989 may have reduced 'violent crime by 10 to 15 percent below what it would have
been,' thereby preventing [many serious crimes]." Id. So by reducing the prison population, excuses
reduce the big dividends prisons pay to Black People. Put differently, if more unexcused Black
criminals mean more Niggas in prison, then rejecting excuses and landing more Niggas in prison may
be good policy for Black People in that, according to cost-benefit thinking about criminal matters,
"prisons are a real bargain." KADISH, supra note 24, at 102 (citation omitted). This logic applies
even to "relatively minor, nonviolent infractions," like broken windows, curfew violations, or
nonviolent drug activity. See KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 304.
128 KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 20.
129 Statement of Decision, Request for Clemency by Stanley Williams, (Dec. 12, 2005)
(corrected version) available at http:/perma.cc/K3PZ-QNKK. After twenty-two years on death row
he was executed in 2005 after then Governor Schwarzenegger refused to stay his execution officially
on the ground that Mr. Williams had not achieved personal redemption. Hence, Mr. Williams, from
the standpoint of Good Negro Theory, was an officially irredeemable Nigga. Sarah Kershaw,
Governor Rejects Clemency for Inmate on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/13/national/13tookie.html.
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violence. ' ' 3° From this perspective, calling destructive criminals like gangbangers
racial "brothers" or "sisters"--words of solidarity and in-group love-rings as
false as calling viciously racist white cops "brothers" or "sisters."
From a cost-benefit standpoint, many criminal matters pit the interests "us"
Black People against "them" Niggas. Thus, "colorblind criminal laws"--that is,
laws silent on race and not enacted for the purpose of treating one racial group
different than another-whose effects disproportionately burden Niggas can be
good social policy for law-abiding blacks. For instance, laws that punish crack
offenders much more harshly than powder cocaine offenders (who more often are
white) may help Black People more than they hurt Niggas, say Good Negro
Theorists, "by incarcerating for longer periods those who use and sell a drug that
has had an especially devastating effect on African-American communities."'
31
By the same logic, because urban curfews that disproportionately fall upon black
youngsters also help some black residents feel more secure, such disparities may
help Black People more than they hurt Niggas. 3 2 Similarly, because crackdowns
on gangs that disproportionately affect black gang members also reduce gang-
related crime, Black People may be helped more than Niggas hurt by such racial
disparities. 33  And because prosecutions of pregnant drug addicts that
disproportionately fall on pregnant black women also may deter conduct harmful
to black unborn babies, Black People may be helped more than Niggas hurt by
such racial disparities. 134
Under this cost-benefit or welfare principle-and positing that most blacks in
the aggregate are law-abiding-there is no reason to give any special weight to the
interests and frustrations of black criminals. As David Lyons describes this
approach in Ethics and the Rule of Law, when interests conflict "we should serve
the greater aggregate interest, taking into account all the benefits and burdens that
might result from the decisions that are available to us.' 35 By this logic, because
the social, political and safety costs of excusing black criminals fall mainly on the
larger Black People subdivision while the benefits of excusing them are reaped
mainly by the smaller Nigga contingent, recognizing general excuses for black
wrongdoers fails the cost-benefit test of desirability by burdening Black People
130 KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 20 (quoting Jerry G. Watts, Reflections on the King Verdict, in
READING RODNEY KING READING/READING URBAN UPRISING 244 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed.,
1993)).
131 Id. at 10.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 Id. Viewing laws like these as "social policy" propositions, Kennedy concludes that "it is
often unclear whether social policy that is silent as to race and devoid of a covert racial purpose is
harmful or helpful to blacks as a whole since, typically, such a policy will burden some blacks and
benefit others. Id. at 11.
135 DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 112 (1984).
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more than they benefit Niggas. 136 From this perspective, even if judges, jurors,
voters, policymakers and the rest of us make racist, biased or otherwise irrational
moral judgments of black wrongdoers, laws and other social practices that help the
larger Black People subdivision more than they hurt the smaller Nigga subgroup
are nevertheless cost-justified and desirable, no matter how unfair from the
standpoint of retribution or the culpability principle.
This completes my outline of Good Negro Theory, an interlocking set of
values, beliefs and assumptions rooted in moral and legal theories that
conveniently advance the interests of disproportionately privileged law-abiding
blacks at the expense of those who are disproportionately extremely
disadvantaged.
At the conceptual level, the object of Nigga Theory is to attack every one of
these values, beliefs and assumptions and thereby expose the blame and
punishment problem for what it really is-not a moral or personal responsibility
problem but a political and social one, all the way down. To that end, in other
work I attack the legitimacy and reliability of moral and legal condemnations of
black wrongdoers on philosophical and empirical grounds. I turn now to the
broader social and political implications of not critically interrogating our moral
condemnation of black wrongdoers and hence of giving in to the "retributive
urge."
136 When the interests of these two subdivisions collide, the moral and legal principle that
should settle the conflict, according to Good Negro Theory, is the welfare principle-the principle
that laws are good if they increase the satisfaction of the larger Black People subdivision more than
they increase the frustration of the smaller Nigga subdivision. One great attraction of the welfare
principle is that it does not play favorites-the principle does not require the interests of Bad Negroes
to be discounted on account of their moral blameworthiness. Each person's welfare figures in the
rough calculations of costs and benefits that shape social policy-no one's may be discounted. In the
words that John Stuart Mill attributed to Jeremy Bentham, "everybody [is] to count for one, nobody
for more than one." JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 93 (Cambridge University Press 1899).
If an interest can be served, that creates a reason to do whatever would serve it. Interests can
be ordered in terms of the degree of satisfaction or frustration serving them would produce. There is
good reason, then, to promote satisfaction as much as possible. Thus, the welfare principle seems to
provide a reasonable, neutral moral and legal principle for adjudicating conflicts of interests between
subdivisions of any social group-it says that when interests conflict, we should serve the greatest
aggregate interest. The principle thus expresses benevolence in the sense of concern for all
humans-an attractive moral attitude. (But why regard benevolence as the most basic moral
attitude-attractive as it is-rather than a concern or passion for justice?!) And it provides clear,
general guidance to policymakers seeking to advance the interests of blacks in criminal matters.
Applied to racially burdensome criminal laws, the welfare principle provides moral and legal support
for viewing such laws as good for "blacks as a group" inasmuch as the costs of such laws (blame and
punishment) fall disproportionately on the smaller Nigga subdivision while their benefits (increased
safety and respectability) accrue primarily to the larger subdivision of Good Negroes. The interests
of Good Negroes, in other words, can be tantamount to those of "the black community" and "blacks
as a group" in criminal matters. Racially burdensome laws can represent, in Kennedy's words, a "net
plus.., for African-Americans as a group." See KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 11.
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III. THE RETRIBUTIVE URGE, CAUSATION
AND AMERICA'S DENIAL OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Deniers reject our collective accountability for the crack plague and its
festering aftermath on two standard grounds:
A) impersonal social forces cannot cause people to choose to do wrong
or
B) even if empirical evidence proves that such forces do cause voluntary
wrongdoing in the sense of increasing the rate at which people make
wicked criminal choices, the very fact that some or many similarly
situated non-criminals chose not to commit similar crimes-the very fact
of a wicked choice-cuts off our collective accountability on "proximate
cause" grounds.
I critique each of these grounds below.
A. Impersonal Social Forces Cannot Cause Persons to Make Wicked Choices
The first defense Deniers raise against our collective accountability for the
crack plague and its legacy is the common assertion that voluntary criminal acts
cannot be caused by impersonal macro-level social factors like poverty and social
inequality. Stated more generally, the assertion is that voluntary human action
cannot be "determined" by social factors or external influences and thus that there
can be no "social determinism." In keeping with this approach, Deniers attribute
wrongful behavior to persons and their individual choices rather than to social
situations and factors beyond their control. A bad person, Deniers declare, is
different than a bad thing, bad event, or bad social fact. We may deplore tsunamis,
avalanches or shark attacks, but we would not morally blame these impersonal
destructive forces any more than we would blame a rock for falling on one's head,
for we reserve blame and praise for persons with wills and character traits.
137
Deniers contend that macro-level approaches offend the personal dignity of
wrongdoers by treating them as things or events or Pavlovian bundles of
conditioned reflexes without hearts or minds or wills. For Deniers and other
proponents of personal responsibility, this is the Achilles heel of all macro-level
explanations of wrongdoing and the flaw in the logic of all broad excuses for
criminal misconduct: Such explanations and excuses, they contend, deny the
personhood of criminals by treating them as bad "social facts" rather than bad
137 And persons have the capacity to recognize the difference between right and wrong and to
act for moral reasons. See generally Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing
the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1511 (1992).
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persons.138  Accordingly, personal responsibility champions tell us we must
condemn black criminals to show them respect and damn them in the name of their
own personal dignity.
Nevertheless, if sound empirical evidence compels the conclusion that
criminal wrongdoing is caused by social forces such as extreme social
disadvantage, as it overwhelmingly does, then responsibility for the crack plague
and its calamitous aftermath cannot so hastily be shifted to individual wrongdoers
themselves. A clear causal link between social facts and voluntary wrongful acts
paves the way for holding all beneficiaries of the boon we call the American way
of life accountable for its criminogenic social conditions. Social science proves
the existence of a clear causal link between social facts and personal, private,
individual acts. For instance, in his pioneering work, Suicide: A Study in
Sociology, Emile Durkheim showed how the seemingly most personal, private, and
even "anti-social" decision of someone to end his own existence rather than
continue to suffer a weary life-a decision ostensibly rooted only in individual
psychology, private thought processes, and personal demons-actually reflects
social currents and at bottom is primarily a social (not psychological or biological)
fact. 139 The social character of deliberate acts of violent self-destruction can
remain hidden if we look only at a separate individual and his melancholy
musings; but the social character of suicide leaps into bold relief when we look at
rates of suicide. These suicide rates differ among societies, and among different
groups in the same society, and they show regularities over time, with changes in
them often occurring at similar times in different societies. "Each society,"
Durkheim observes, "is predisposed to contribute a definite quota of voluntary
deaths." 140 These regular, predictable, stable patterns of "personal and private"
decisions to shuffle off this mortal coil-in short, these systematic suicidal
tendencies-cannot be explained purely in terms of psychological facts, individual
mental states or random aggregations of dire deeds. Rather, these patterns point to
underlying causes that produce suicidal thoughts and acts in groups of
138 Making it seem natural to ordinary Americans to focus on the person over the social
situation when assessing black wrongdoing are two basic psychological tendencies shared by most
Americans, namely, "fundamental attribution error" (the general psychological tendency to explain
human behavior in terms of personality traits rather than situational factors) and race-based
attribution bias (the special tendency of observers to attribute wrongdoing by blacks to personality
traits rather than to situational pressures). See Bridges & Steen, supra note 116, at 554-57. So our
racially biased and person-centered social psychology, on the one hand, and the popular person-
centered politics of personal responsibility and rugged individualism, on the other, combine to make
millions of ordinary Americans skeptical of macro-level social explanations of crime.
139 EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 297-99 (George Simpson ed., John A.
Spaulding & George Simpson trans., The Free Press 1897) (wishing to show that social factors could
explain much about anti-social phenomena).
140 Id. at 51.
2014]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
individuals. 141 The decisive question then is, "what factors explain these group-
level patterns of voluntary self-destruction?" 142 Earlier, I identified five macro-
level social factors that explain the crack epidemic and the empirical evidence that
points to them. 143 But even if empirical studies persuasively establish that crime is
driven by social factors like the five I identified, Deniers commonly fall back on
the following seductive but false "proximate cause" defense against collective
accountability for the voluntary misdeeds of wrongdoing.
B. Even if Social Facts Can Cause Crime, the Wicked Choices of Criminals Break
the Causal Chain and Absolve Us as a Nation
Deniers' second and most formidable defense against America's
accountability for undoing an entire generation of blacks through unnecessary and
unwarranted mass incarceration runs thus: "Even if we acknowledge what the
empirical evidence clearly demonstrates, namely, that macro-level social factors
can cause people to commit voluntary criminal acts in the sense of dramatically
increasing the rate of wrongdoing in certain neighborhoods and for certain social
subgroups, why don't criminogenic social forces cause everyone subject to them to
turn to crime? Why doesn't everyone who is poor, hungry, and socially
marginalized rob convenience stores or post up under lampposts with palms full of
dope? Why do so many poor and jobless people in general-and poor jobless
blacks in particular-wade through criminogenic social currents without turning to
violence or larceny or other wrongdoing?" To bolster the persuasive force of these
denials of accountability, the person posing these skeptical questions may himself
or herself be someone poor and black and extremely disadvantaged-a political
poster child for bi-partisan Deniers and other champions of personal
responsibility-who nevertheless resisted temptation and provocation to remain
law-abiding and hence righteously critical of have-nots who have not. From this
perspective, the very fact that many or most people subject to 'criminogenic' social
factors do not commit such acts proves that such factors leave ample room for
peoples' wills and moral character and moral agency to determine what they do.
By this logic, the reason poor but law-abiding Americans suffer the slings and
arrows of outrageous fortune with self-control while criminals do not is simply
141 Durkheim's method is empirical; he searches through various sorts of data and evidence to
find factors associated with suicide, but he searches for social causes or conditions that are expressed
through these associations. Id. at 297-99.
142 Durkheim tests and rejects a variety of possible non-social explanations for these stable and
variable rates of suicide, such as heredity, climate, and mental illness, until he whittles down the
possibilities to one, namely, the social explanation. Id. By eliminating other explanations, Durkheim
claims that these tendencies must depend on social causes and must be collective phenomena. Id. at
149. He points out that a suicide rate is a "numerical datum" that measures and expresses each
society's "aptitude for suicide," that is, "the suicidal tendency with which each society is collectively
afflicted." Id. at 48-51.
143 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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because the non-criminals have more moral fiber. For Deniers, the "vicious wills,"
depraved hearts, and blameworthy choices of black criminals break the causal
chain between criminogenic social facts and individual criminal acts and thus
absolve America of accountability for the crack plague and its aftermath.
144
Deniers can find strong support in law and everyday morality for their
contention that voluntary human action breaks the causal chain and thus cuts off
the accountability of earlier individuals or entities that "set the stage" for
subsequent wrongdoing. A core tenet of American civil and criminal law is that
for an individual or entity to be accountable for harm resulting from destructive
forces it unleashes (including destructive social forces), those forces must be the
"factual cause" and the "proximate cause" of the resulting harm. Factual cause
(sometimes called the "but-for" or "sine qua non" requirement) means that the
resulting harm (here, the cataclysmic crack plague and its festering aftermath)
would not have occurred without the defendant's acts (here, without the five
macro-level social facts attributable to America's collective life and social reality).
Proximate cause means that the defendant's acts, in addition to being a but-for
cause, must be adequately or properly related to the resulting harm in the eyes of
ordinary judges and jurors. So, for Deniers and other personal responsibility
proponents, even if macro-level social forces are a factual cause of voluntary
crack-connected criminal conduct in that such forces can cause dramatic spikes in
crime rates as a function of neighborhood demography, these social forces are not
a proximate cause of the extra criminal acts. According to these Deniers, this is
because the wicked choices of wrongdoers intervened between the extreme
disadvantage, on the one hand, and the individual holdups, drive-bys, and street
crimes, on the other.
For instance, if a gasoline truck and trailer unit spills a massive amount of gas
on an open highway and malicious bystanders willfully kindle a conflagration with
a book of matches, some courts refuse to hold the truck owner accountable to
innocent bum victims (much less to the malicious match-strikers themselves)
because these courts conclude that the volatile spill was not the "proximate cause"
of the resulting flames, even though it was clearly a necessary condition or factual
cause of the fire. These courts say that the malicious match-strikers are the
"superseding," "efficient," or "proximate" cause of the fiery destruction, thus
shifting the entire responsibility for the flames to the willful wrongdoers and away
from the truck owner whose volatile spill set the stage. For these courts, results
(here, fiery destruction) that follow from the voluntary actions of the subsequent
persons (here, the malicious match strikers) are caused by them alone. 145
144 "Surely," say personal responsibility proponents, "American society cannot be held
accountable for the wicked choices, bad moral character, and 'vicious wills' of a crime-prone
subdivision of its population."
145 See Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310, 312 (Pa. 1961) (explaining that a drag racing
victim's death was caused "by him alone," not his fellow drag racer) (emphasis added); KADIsti,
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This notion is sometimes called the doctrine of novus actus interveniens.
Under the novus actus doctrine, later voluntary human action "displaces the
relevance of prior conduct by others and provides a new foundation for causal
responsibility." 146 Glanville Williams provides the classic defense of the doctrine:
A person is primarily responsible for what he himself does. He is
not responsible, not blameworthy, for what other people do. The fact
that his own conduct, rightful or wrongful, provided the background for a
subsequent voluntary and wrong act by another does not make him
responsible for it. What he does may be a but for cause of the injurious
act, but he did not do it. His conduct is not an imputable cause of it.
Only the later actor, the doer of the act that intervenes between the first
act and the result, the final wielder of human autonomy in the matter,
bears responsibility (along with his accomplices) for the result that
ensues. 147
From this perspective, the violent and non-violent criminal acts of blacks
during and after the cataclysmic crack plague are caused solely by them.
By analogy, for the 30 years encompassing the crack plague and it's still
festering aftermath, America flooded black neighborhoods with combustible
criminogenic conditions like extreme and concentrated social disadvantage;
moreover, according to Senate transcripts and other reliable sources, 148 in the
critical period between 1982 and 1988, this nation, through its policymakers and
high ranking government officials, helped jumpstart and fuel the crack epidemic by
knowingly (but not maliciously or hatefully) helping supply many matchbooks in
the form of guns and drugs to young black males wading through these volatile
conditions. But, whereas combustible gas spills do not penetrate the skin of those
it contacts, merely providing opportunities for wrongdoers to manifest pre-existing
malice, combustible criminogenic conditions penetrate to the mental states of those
immersed in them-these conditions mold mental states and thus manufacture
malice itself. Specifically, extreme and hyperconcentrated disadvantage produced
the hopelessness, resentment, hostility, and alienation-in a word, the malice-that
motivate law-breaking, while an ample supply of guns and drugs, at least partly
supra note 24, at 529 (emphasis added) ("The results that follow from the second person's actions are
caused by him or her alone.").
146 KADISH ET AL., supra note 24, at 529.
147 Glanville Williams, Finis for Novus Actus?, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 391, 391 (1989). As he
goes on to explain: "The legal attitude, in general, rests on what is known to philosophers as the
principle of autonomy, which enters deeply into our traditional moral perceptions, reinforced by
language." Id. "The autonomy doctrine, expressing itself through its corollary the doctrine of novus
actus interveniens, teaches that the individual's will is the autonomous (self-regulating) prime cause
of behaviour." Id. at 392.
148 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (addressing the Contra-CIA link).
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traceable to U.S. foreign policy priorities in the critical early years of the crack
epidemic, provide the means and opportunities for the malice to find expression in
law-breaking. In short, at the level of motivations and at that of opportunities for
wrongdoing, strong empirical evidence points to our collective responsibility for
flooding black neighborhoods with combustible criminogenic conditions that
tempt, pressure, and provoke, then helping supply rafts of matchbooks to the
young black residents in the name of national security. 1
49
This is precisely where Deniers invoke the novus actus doctrine as a
"proximate cause defense" and assert that the wicked decisions of the individuals
slogging through combustible social currents to pick up matchbooks and spread
fiery destruction cuts off our collective accountability for their foreseeable and
even statistically inevitable but nonetheless voluntary match-striking. For Deniers,
in other words, the willful and wicked intervention of match-striking
wrongdoers-the voluntary rubbing of each white phosphorous match head against
a rough surface to produce a flame-breaks the causal chain between social facts
and criminal acts. The results that follow from their voluntary actions are caused
solely by them. For Deniers, however abundant the opportunities of the situation
or strong the socially molded motivations of the person, choosing to strike a match
constitutes a personal and individual "moral moment" that severs the link between
social forces and crimes and erects a boundary between social facts and personal
responsibility.
Thus, as applied to the crack plague that bore down upon and destroyed black
communities in the 80s and 90s like a raging wildfire, Deniers can concede at the
level of factual causation that social forces (such as the five macro-level social
factors discussed earlier) dramatically increased the rate of crime and incarceration
in black America and hence orchestrated the general movement of the fire, the
general symphony of the conflagration, but they may nevertheless contend that
each individual decision to dance to that malicious melody by striking a match
breaks the causal chain between America's volatile social currents and the
crackling flames. Put differently, mediating the relationship between social facts
and criminal acts are criminal intents and vicious wills and depraved hearts, and
for Deniers, these wicked inner states cut off our collective accountability for the
criminal acts produced by our collective existence.
C. Competing Doctrine: Later Voluntary Wrongdoing Does Not Break Causal
Chain
On the other hand, courts and juries and legislatures often refuse to treat
subsequent voluntary human action as outside of causal law-that is, they refuse to
treat such action as the sole cause of criminal results-and so are perfectly willing
149 See generally Kerry Committee Report, supra note 53; GARY WEBB, DARK ALLIANCE: THE
CIA, THE CONTRAS, AND THE CRACK COCAINE EXPLOSION (1998).
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to say that blameworthy intervening action does not break the chain of causation or
constitute an "independent intervening cause," so long as the subsequent
wrongdoing was foreseeable. In State v. Bier,150 for instance, when the
defendant's wife said she wanted to commit suicide, he placed a loaded, cocked
pistol within her reach, and she used it to kill herself. 151  The defendant's
conviction for negligent homicide was upheld on appeal-foreseeability was
enough to establish proximate cause; 152 a driver who negligently leaves his car
idling and unattended can be the proximate cause of death or serious bodily harm
resulting from a car thief on a joy ride153-the foreseeability of thieves and joy
rides establishes proximate cause; the owner of an apartment building in a crime-
ridden location who fails to install locks on entrance doors or provide exterior
lighting can be the proximate cause of robberies, rapes, and other violent assaults
on tenants by intervening human agents who intentionally act to produce the
forbidden result-foreseeability establishes accountability; 154 one drag racer can be
liable for causing the death of his racing partner despite his partner's voluntary
choice to drive recklessly-again on grounds of foreseeability; 55 in a game of
Russian roulette, the surviving player will be liable for killing his partner even
though the deceased freely chose to put the gun to his head and squeezed the
trigger 1-foreseeability suffices; and finally courts routinely ignore or reject the
novus actus or intervening-act doctrine and hold drug suppliers accountable for the
foreseeable, though freely chosen, acts of their purchasers, including their
purchasers' drug overdoses and resulting deaths. 1
57
So just like everyday morality, the law does not follow a hard fixed rule about
causation and accountability when subsequent voluntary human actions intervene
between forces that set the stage for criminal acts and the criminal acts themselves.
Rather, the law remains ceaselessly torn between two competing perspectives.
"0 591 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Mont. 1979).
151 KADISH ET AL., supra note 24 at 527 n.6.
152 It should be noted that this is a minority position in cases of suicide. This is contrary to the
standard common law treatment of assisted suicides; under common law courts refused to find
causation on novus actus grounds. See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983);
People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 739 (Mich. 1994). Although a minority position, Bier shows
the willingness of courts to take a flexible approach to causation in cases of voluntary intervening
human action. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
'53 Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 196 (N.M. 2003).
154 See Doe v. Gunny's Ltd. P'ship, 593 N.W.2d 284, 294 (Neb. 1999); Knoll v. Bd. of
Regents, 601 N.W.2d 757, 764-65 (Neb. 1999); Sharkey v. Bd. of Regents, 615 N.W.2d 889, 901-02
(Neb. 2000).
155 State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 611-13 (Iowa 1982).
156 Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223, 223-25 (Mass. 1963).
157 People v. Galle, 573 N.E.2d 569, 570-71 (N.Y. 1991); Causation: R v. Kennedy, 1999
CRIM. L. REv. 65, 65-67 (1999); see generally Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Homicide Liability for the
Furnishing of Dangerous Narcotics, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 161 (1987) (analyzing numerous
cases where the state court held a provider of heroin liable for the death of another party).
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Pulling one way is the perspective that underlies the novus actus or intervening act
doctrine-indeed underlies all retributive approaches to blame and punishment-
and is enthusiastically endorsed by tough-on-crime advocates, namely, the view
that humans are solely and fully responsible for their freely chosen actions. As
tough-on-crime advocates see it, any departure from this principle of sole and full
responsibility puts us on the slippery slope to social determinism and the complete
abdication of personal responsibility. Accordingly, this perspective refuses to see
freely chosen human action as caused by preceding forces or factors. Pulling the
other way is the perspective underlying the many exceptions to the novus actus
doctrine and endorsed by advocates for the damned, a perspective which views
"freely chosen" wrongdoing as caused by a combination of preceding social facts
and the wrongdoer's ordinary human frailty. Accordingly, this perspective has no
problem seeing voluntary human action as caused by preceding forces and factors.
Pendulum-like, the law and our everyday moral intuitions swing back and forth
between these competing conceptions of causation and accountability.
This raises the pivotal question in all debates about where to draw the line
between societal accountability and personal responsibility for the harmful results
of voluntary wrongdoing: What factors determine which way the causation
pendulum swings in the minds of ordinary judges, jurors, lawmakers, voters and
other Americans who must think about such matters in reaching decisions? What
determines whether the subsequent voluntary acts of wrongdoers are deemed the
sole causes of the criminal results? What makes ordinary people in some cases
view the voluntary wrongdoing of criminals as breaking the causal chain between
external factors and criminal acts (hence shifting all the responsibility for the
criminal acts and harmful results to individual wrongdoers) while in other cases
social perceivers and decision makers view such wrongdoing as caused by
preceding factors (hence shifting accountability for those criminal acts and harmful
results back to the earlier acts, facts, and circumstances)? To put it most simply,
what determines how people think about proximate causation in criminal matters?
The answer is this: the perceived wickedness of wrongdoers and the urge they
arouse in ordinary people for vengeance and retribution. The way perceptions of
wickedness and vengeance drive our conclusions about causation is this: the more
wicked wrongdoers seem, the more they stir "the retributive urge" to blame and
punish; the more they stir "the retributive urge," the more likely ordinary people
are to view them as "independent intervening causes" or "superseding causes" of
criminal harms disconnected from earlier forces and factors. 158 Contrary to what
we might expect, first come judgments about wrongdoers' blameworthiness, then
come conclusions about whether preceding forces and factors caused the results of
their voluntary wrongdoing. This sounds backward and counterintuitive because
158 This analysis assumes that we don't find the conduct of earlier actors and agents extremely
wicked and reprehensible (we may even find it innocent). For if the earlier actors stir a strong
retributive urge, the same logic may apply to them and there could be a pull toward finding the earlier
actors to be the proximate cause of the resulting harm on that basis.
2014]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
we expect the conclusion that A should be blamed for B's death to be partly based
on the judgment that A caused B's death--"you can't blame me for a death I never
caused" sounds sensible and implies that first we exhaust all questions of causation
(these become threshold questions of accountability) and only then, after finding
that A caused B's death, do we weigh A's blameworthy wickedness.
Nevertheless, the everyday reality of our actual decision making reverses the
idealized roles usually assigned to blame and causation, for we routinely blame
individuals before we decide whether to call them "independent," "superseding,"
or "efficient" causes of voluntary criminal actions; in other words, we base our
conclusions about causation on earlier conclusions about the wrongdoers'
wickedness; once more, we base our conclusions about whether preceding forces
and factors are the proximate cause of voluntary wrongdoing on conclusions about
the wickedness and moral turpitude of the voluntary wrongdoers. 159 However
counterintuitive this pattern may initially sound, it pervades all moral and legal
thinking. In the words of Meir Dan-Cohen,
[T]he statement that A caused B's death may, in ordinary speech, be as
much a conclusory statement, based on the prior tacit judgment that A
deserves to be punished for B's death, as it is an independent statement
of fact which leads to that conclusion.
Put differently,
[T]he conclusion that A deserves to be punished may be directly and
intuitively generated by the retributive urge, preceding and merely
rationalized by the finding of a sufficient causal relationship between A's
acts and B's death. 160
159 Dan-Cohen, supra note 17, at 165-66.
160 Id at 166 (emphasis added). Meir Dan-Cohen focuses here on the impact of the retributive
urge on our judgment of whether a wrongdoer who set the stage for othe forces and actors to bring
about a forbidden result "proximately caused" that result. I am extending his insight to include the
impact of the retributive urge on another "proximate cause" judgment, namely, our judgment of
whether a wrongdoer for whom the stage was set by other forces and actors was nevertheless the
"superseding," "efficient," "sole" cause of the forbidden result. So, the retributive urge can influence
proximate cause determinations by social and legal decisionmakers on two different levels: when
focused primarily on earlier actors who set the stage for later wrongdoing by subsequent actors, an
inflamed retributive urge can increase the willingness of decisionmakers to hold these earlier actors
accountable for the later actions of subsequent wrongdoers; alternatively, when focused primarily on
the subsequent actors in a causal sequence who more immediately cause the crime in question (the
crime's "immediate perpetrators"), an inflamed retributive urge can induce decisionmakers to view
them as the superseding-i.e. proximate--causes of the crime, and hence to hold them solely
responsible, thereby relieving earlier wrongdoers (and the criminogenic conditions they create) of any
causal responsibility. When the retributive urge is aroused on both levels (that is, by both earlier and
later wrongdoers), judgments about the comparative blameworthiness of such wrongdoers (along
with other factors) will drive judgments about whether only the later actor was the proximate cause of
the harm (its sole cause) or instead whether causal accountability rests on both.
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In short, the retributive urge-rooted in contempt for wicked and
blameworthy wrongdoers-routinely determines how we think about causation. 161
From this very practical perspective on how ordinary people inside and
outside courtrooms actually think about and determine causation, the question of
whether A was the sole or superseding cause of B's death boils down to the
question of whether punishing A is necessary to satisfy the retributive urge he
arouses in us: If the fact of B's death at the hands of A does not produce a strong
retributive urge-that is, if we are willing to partially or fully excuse A for
bringing about the prohibited result-then we are more willing to call other factors
preceding or surrounding A's act (including macro-level factors) the proximate
cause of B's death. 162 Conversely, the more we view wrongdoers as wickedly
depraved, the more they stir the retributive urge for vengeance and retribution, the
easier it is for us to conclude that their voluntary wrongdoing breaks the causal
chain between earlier factors and their crime, shifts responsibility for crime
entirely to them, and absolves us as a nation of accountability for the abundantly
foreseeable results of our own social forces and currents.
All of this has particular consequences for this project, and for Nigga Theory
more broadly. Quite simply, the more we view wrongdoers as that most distilled
and concentrated form of wickedness, namely, morally condemnable niggers, the
easier it is for us to deny accountability for their plight, for moral judgments drive
our conclusions about causation and thus drive our conclusions about our
collective accountability for the criminogenic effects of extreme disadvantage.
Niggerizing black wrongdoers, in other words, helps us deny our accountability for
the foreseeable effects of being extremely poor, hopeless, and black in America.
But again, a core aspect of Nigga Theory is hope. Once the moral basis for
the retributive urge is shown to be illegitimate, irrational, and unreliable, it may
become easier for fair-minded Americans to curb (at least temporarily) their urge
to condemn long enough to recognize and acknowledge the causal links between
crime and our own macro-level social forces, paving the way for us to accept
collective accountability for the crack plague and its consequences. Macro-level
perspectives-which an inflamed retributive urge obscures--can help law-abiding
Americans see the common humanity in wrongdoers by helping them think beyond
the boundaries of good and evil and praise and blame in criminal matters. Of
161 And also routinely determines accountability.
162 "Posed in connection with the retributive goal of punishment, the question of causation
(namely, 'Is there a causal relation between A's conduct and B's death?') amounts to asking whether
punishing A is necessary to satisfy the retributive urge aroused by the fact of B's death." Id. This
explains why the novus actus doctrine breaks the causal chain more easily for intentional intervening
wrongdoing than for merely reckless or negligent intervening wrongdoing, for although both
intentional and reckless wrongdoing involve voluntary action, a reckless intervening act is generally
less blameworthy than an intentional intervening act. The retributive urge may also drive our
tendency to attribute wrongdoing to the situation or person in applications of the "reasonable person
in the situation" test.
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course, it flatters those of us who are prosperous and law-abiding to believe that
our material well-being and good name reflect virtue and pluck, not luck. But
from the macro-level perspective, such thinking is unwarranted but nevertheless
widespread and pregnant with political implications for our treatment of the truly
disadvantaged.
